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Extraordinary Rendition:
A Human Rights Analysis
David Weissbrodt*
Amy Bergquist**
INTRODUCTION
On September 13, 1995, local police in Croatia seized Egyptian national
Talaat Fouad Qassem, and then handed him over to CIA agents.1 Qassem had
fled Egypt after the Egyptian government accused him of involvement in the
assassination of Anwar Sadat; the Egyptian government subsequently sentenced
him to death in absentia.2 The CIA agents took him on board a ship in the
Adriatic Sea and interrogated him. 3 Then, they delivered Qassem to Egypt,
where he disappeared. 4 A human rights reporter in Egypt believes he has been
executed.5
In the summer of 2003, Kurdish soldiers in Iraq captured Iraqi national
Hiwa Abdul Rahman Rashul somewhere in Iraq. 6 They handed him over to
CIA agents, who flew him to Afghanistan for interrogation.' When a legal
advisor for the U.S. administration balked at the transfer, Rashul was flown
back to Iraq, but, at the request of CIA director George J. Tenet, Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld ordered that Rashul be hidden from Red Cross
officials and not be given a prisoner number.8 According to The Washington
Post, "[hlis current status is unknown. 9
In December 2003, Kuwaiti-born German national Khaled el Masri boarded
a bus in his home of Ulm, Germany, to travel to Skopje, Macedonia. 10 When
* Regents Professor and Fredrikson & Byron Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
** J.D. Candidate, University of Minnesota Law School, Class of 2007; B.A., Amherst College, 1991.
1. Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America's "Extraordinary Rendition" Program,
NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106, 109.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Dana Priest, Memo Lets CIA Take Detainees Out of Iraq: Practice Is Called Serious Breach of Geneva Con-
ventions, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2004, at Al.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Details of Khaled el Masri's abduction are reported in numerous sources. See Bruce Zagaris, U.S.
Extraordinary Renditions Subject to Foreign and U.S. Investigations and Oversight, 21 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L.
REP. 188 (2005); Michael Hirsh et al., AboardAir CIA, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 28, 2005, at 32; Scott Shane et
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he arrived at the Macedonian border on December 31, Macedonian police
took him off the bus, confiscated his passport, and detained him for three
weeks. On January 23, 2004, a jet with tail number N313P, registered to
Premier Executive Transport Services, a CIA front-company, arrived in Ma-
cedonia from the island of Majorca. El Masri was driven to the Skopje air-
port, where he was handed over to CIA officials. Men wearing black masks
and black gloves beat him, cut off his clothes, and then injected him with
drugs. He was then placed on the airplane and flown, first, to Baghdad, and
then to Kabul. When he arrived in Afghanistan, U.S. officials interrogated
him and held him in solitary confinement for nearly five months. In May 2004,
he was flown back to Central Europe and released near a checkpoint on the
Albanian border, on the order of U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice.
His detention was apparently a case of mistaken identity. When el Masri
returned home to Germany, he learned that his wife and children had gone
to stay with her family in Lebanon; his wife thought he had abandoned the
family.
The stories of Qassem, Rashul, and el Masri are not unique. They describe
a human rights abuse called "extraordinary rendition"; a strategy that a se-
ries of U.S. administrations developed and refined, and in which numerous
countries now participate.
Under the Clinton administration, most extraordinary renditions appeared to
be subject to strict procedures. First, the receiving country had to have an
outstanding arrest warrant for the person.1" Second, each extraordinary ren-
dition was subject to extensive administrative scrutiny before it was approved
by senior government officials. 12 Third, the local government was notified.
13
al., CIA Expanding Terror Battle Under Guise of Charter Flights, N.Y TIMES, May 31, 2005, at Al; Craig
Whitlock, Europeans Investigate CIA Role in Abductions, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2005, at Al; CBS News:
CIA Flying Suspects to Torture? (CBS television broadcast Mar. 6, 2005) [hereinafter CBS News].
11. See Mayer, supra note 1, at 106-07 ("[Extraordinary rendition] began as a program aimed at ...
people against whom there were outstanding foreign arrest warrants."). Mayer notes that in some cases in
the 1990s, the United States successfully pressured potential receiving countries to issue arrest warrants.
Id. at 110.
12. See Stephen P Cutler, Building International Cases, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Dec. 1, 1999, at 5
("Forcible return, known as extraordinary rendition, also may be an option but poses special considera-
tions .... The U.S. Department of Justice prohibits forcible returns without prior approval by senior
U.S. government officials."); Alan J. Kreczko, Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, The Alvarez-
Machain Decision: U.S. Jurisdiction over Foreign Criminal Humberto Alvarez Machain, Statement Be-
fore the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Committee (July 24,
1992), in 3 U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 616, Aug. 3, 1992 ("These procedures require that decisions as to
extraordinary renditions from foreign territories be subject to full inter-agency coordination and that they
be considered at the highest levels of the government."); Tracy Wilkinson & Bob Drogin, Missing Imam's
Trail Said to Lead from Italy to CIA, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2005, at Al ("'Each one had to be built almost as
if it's a court case in the United States,' said [Michael] Scheuer, who from January 1996 to July 1999 ran
the [Central Intelligence Algency's clandestine unit searching for Osama bin Laden. 'I always assumed if
I had 15 lawyers' signatures, it was probably fine."').
13. See, e.g., Rajiv Chandrasekaran & Peter Finn, U.S. Behind Secret Transfer of Terror Suspects, WASH.
POST, Mar. 11, 2002, at Al (describing U.S. cooperation with Albanian security forces in 1998 to gather
intelligence on five individuals suspected of being members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and then to
transfer those individuals to Egypt); Mayer, supra note 1, at 109-10.
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Further, the CIA was required to obtain an assurance from the receiving gov-
ernment that the individual would not be ill-treated. 14 Although the total
number of extraordinary renditions to date remains unclear, 15 there is a wide
consensus that the program has accelerated since September 11, 2001.16 In
part, the acceleration can be attributed to expedited procedures approved by
President Bush, affording additional flexibility to the CIA. 17 For example,
charges are sometimes brought only after the CIA has seized the suspect and
requested cooperation. 18 The strategy of extraordinary rendition evolved and
expanded as the United States attempted to strengthen its efforts in the "war
on terror."19 In its present form, extraordinary rendition usually involves a
person who is not formally charged with any crime by the country conducting
the abduction. Instead, the person is seized abroad and transported to a third
country.
The twentieth century movement to establish international human rights
standards emerged as a reaction to the horrors of the Second World War.20 Since
that time, as new human rights violations have been identified, the human
rights community has responded: first by naming and describing the viola-
tions, and then by establishing standards to prohibit the abuses. 2 1 "Crimes
14. Wilkinson & Drogin, supra note 12.
15. See Mayer, supra note 1, at 107 (noting that Representative Markey complained that after repeated
requests of CIA officials to provide an accurate count of the number of people transferred, "[tjhey refuse
to answer. All they will say is that they're in compliance with the law"); Dana Priest & Barton Gellman,
U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at Al ("Thousands have been
arrested and held with U.S. assistance in countries known for brutal treatment of prisoners, the officials
said.").
16. See Shannon McCaffrey, Canadian Sent to Syrian Prison Disputes U.S. Claims Against Torture, KNIGHT
RIDDER/TRIB. NEWS SERVICE, July 29, 2004; Whitlock, supra note 10; Wilkinson & Drogin, supra note
12.
17. See Douglas Jehl, Pentagon Seeks to Shift Inmates from Cuba Base, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 11, 2005, at A l;
Douglas Jehl & David Johnston, Rule Change Lets CIA Freely Send Suspects Abroad to Jails, N.Y TIMES,
Mar. 6, 2005, at 1.
18. See Priest & Gellman, supra note 15 ("[Flive officials acknowledged, as one of them put it, 'that
sometimes a friendly country can be invited to "want" someone we grab.' Then, other officials said, the
foreign government will charge him with a crime of some sort.").
19. See generally "War on Terror" Is "Inaccurate" Label for War on Insurgency, 18 INSIDE NAVY (Inside
Washington Publishers, Crystal City, Va.), June 20, 2005. But see Richard W. Stevenson, President Makes
It Clear Phrase is "War on Terror," N.Y TIMES, Aug. 4, 2005, at A12.
20. See JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ORIGINS, DRAFT-
ING, AND INTENT 36-91 (1999) (explaining the role of World War II as a catalyst for the human rights
protections in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights); Asbjorn Eide & Gudmundur Alfredsson,
Introduction, in THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMMON STANDARD OF ACHIEVE-
MENT, at xxv-xxxv (Asbjorn Eide & Gudmundur Alfredsson eds., 1999) ("[T]he Universal Declaration
[of Human Rights] draws on deep and widespread historical roots."). The United Nations Charter (1945)
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) are typically viewed as the basis for modern
international human rights protections, which have subsequently been articulated in numerous human
rights instruments. See DAVID WEISSBRODT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND
PROCESS 8-10 (3d ed. 2001).
21. See MANFRED NOWAK, INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME 273
(2003) (noting that international human rights protections developed "during the second half of the 20th
century in reaction to specific threats," resulting in "reactive and event-driven human rights policies").
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against humanity,"2 2 genocide, 23 and torture24 are all examples of human
rights violations that have been addressed through this process. 25 Over time,
however, new types of human rights violations, such as extraordinary rendi-
tion, have emerged. 26 While human rights instruments may not mention these
new offenses by name,27 various provisions within existing instruments none-
theless usually address and prohibit the offenses. 28 When the practice of dis-
appearances, for example, became widespread in some countries,29 the human
rights community was compelled to examine human rights instruments to
determine which of their provisions were implicated. 30 Ultimately, interna-
22. See THEODOR MERON, WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF AGE 193 (1998) (reporting that the Nurem-
berg Charter defined crimes against humanity as "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and
other inhumane acts ... or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds"); William A. Schabas,
Problems of International Codification: Were the Atrocities in Cambodia and Kosovo Genocide?, 35 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 287, 297-98 (2001) (describing the official adoption of the term crimes against humanity for use in
the charges at the Nuremberg Tribunals).
23. See, e.g., RAPHAEL LEMKIN, Axis RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE 79-94 (1944) (defining the crime
of genocide); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277,
entered into force Jan. 12, 1951; see also Linnea D. Manashaw, Comment, Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing: Why
the Distinction? A Discussion in the Context of Atrocities Occurring in Sudan, 35 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 303, 317
(2005) (observing that the crime of genocide was not defined prior to World War II, and therefore Nazi
officials at Nuremberg were tried for "crimes against humanity").
24. See J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST
TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR
DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 13-15 (1988) (noting that widespread use of torture after
World War II was the impetus for the elaboration of standards prohibiting torture, culminating in the
Convention against Torture); infra note 180 (describing the Convention against Torture's prohibition on
torture).
25. See Richard B. Bilder, An Overview of International Human Rights Law, in GUIDE TO INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 3, 10 (Hurst Hannum ed., 4th ed. 2004) (noting that torture and
genocide, along with several other traditional human rights violations, are now regarded as violations of
customary international law).
26. For example, Nowak observes that these new human rights violations include violations commit-
ted by non-state actors and intergovernmental organizations. See NOWAK, supra note 21, at 275. Ethnic
cleansing and the use of rape as a weapon of war are other examples of newly addressed human rights
violations. See MERON, supra note 22, at 47-48, 205 (1998) (observing that rape was tolerated and even
used as a policy tool during the Second World War, and was also prevalent in the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia); id. at 208-09 (noting that rape has been designated a punishable offense by the Yugoslav
war crimes tribunal).
27. See, e.g., NIGEL S. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 243
(2d ed. 1999) ("[T~he phenomenon [of disappearances] is a special one, with its own characteristics, and
no single international standard has been framed to encompass it.").
28. See, e.g., BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 24, at 1 ("Many people assume that the Convention's
principal aim is to outlaw torture .... On the contrary, the Convention is based upon the recognition that
the ... practice[ ] [is] already outlawed under international law."); WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (2000) (describing the interpretation and expansion of the term genocide to
include ethnic cleansing).
29. See NOWAK, supra note 21, at 290 (describing the "Dirty War" in Argentina between 1976 and
1983, in which the government was responsible for thousands of disappearances). Rodley notes that
disappearances first became widespread in Guatemala in the 1960s. See RODLEY, supra note 27, at 245.
The practice has since been documented in at least seventy-six countries, with over 1000 cases reported
in Argentina, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Iraq, Peru, and Sri Lanka. Id. at 272.
30. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS FACT SHEET No. 6
(rev. 2), ENFORCED OR INVOLUNTARY DISAPPEARANCES 2-3 (1997) (describing the various human rights
implicated by the practice of enforced disappearance); AMNESTY INT'L, "DISAPPEARANCES" AND POLITI-
CAL KILLINGS 97-107 (1994) (same).
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tional bodies drafted new documents to directly address the practice of in-
voluntary disappearances, 31 but they drew on existing instruments to dem-
onstrate that the practice violated long-standing human rights law. 32
As noted above, another novel human rights violation has emerged-a prac-
tice commonly referred to as extraordinary rendition.3 3 Extraordinary rendi-
tion is a hybrid human rights violation, combining elements of arbitrary arrest,
enforced disappearance, forcible transfer, torture, denial of access to consular
officials, and denial of impartial tribunals. It involves the state-sponsored abduc-
tion of a person in one country, with or without the cooperation of the gov-
ernment of that country,34 and the subsequent transfer of that person to an-
other country for detention and interrogation. 35 As is the case with state-
sponsored disappearances, 36 extraordinary rendition appears to be a practice
in which perpetrators attempt to avoid legal and moral constraints by deny-
ing their involvement in the abuses.37 For example, when Amnesty Interna-
tional launched campaigns on behalf of prisoners of conscience during the
31. See Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, G.A. Res. 47/133,
47 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 207, U.N. Doc. A/47/49 (Dec. 18, 1992).
32. See RODLEY, supra note 27, at 255-64 (describing successful challenges to the practice of disap-
pearance that drew on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and various prohibitions on torture
and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment); cf. Manashaw, supra note 23, at 317 (noting
that the people conducting the Nuremberg Tribunals were reluctant to charge Nazi officials with geno-
cide because a common understanding of the term as a criminal offense had only begun to gain currency
in 1944).
33. The U.S. Department of Justice has used this term since the late 1980s. See Richard Sisk & Patrice
O'Shaughnessy, Streetwise Safir's Return, DAILY NEWS (New York), Apr. 14, 1996, at 7. At that time,
however, the term referred to the practice of abducting suspects abroad and bringing them to the United
States or another country to stand trial. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION:
UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 189-90 (2d rev. ed. 1987). Today, the term is an euphemism de-
scribing abduction designed not only to circumvent extradition procedures, but also to avoid the protec-
tions of United States or other judicial authorities. See Gloria Cooper, State of the Art, COLUM. J. REV.,
July 1, 2005, at 13.
34. Some countries facilitate extraordinary rendition by seizing suspects and delivering them to the
custody of officials from another country, who then transfer the detainees. See, e.g., Chandrasekaran &
Finn, supra note 13 (describing Indonesia's cooperation with the United States in the extraordinary rendi-
tion of Muhammad Saad Iqbal Madni). In other cases, extraordinary rendition may take place without the
assistance of local authorities or in violation of local laws. See Whitlock, supra note 10.
35. See Bob Herbert, Op-Ed, It's Called Torture, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2005, at A19 ("What it means is
that the United States seizes individuals, presumably terror suspects, and sends them off without even a
nod in the direction of due process to countries known to practice torture."); Danielle Knight, Outsourcing
a Real Nasty Job, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 23, 2005, at 34 ("What it means is that the CIA or
other government agencies can send, or 'render,' terrorism subjects for interrogation to other countries,
even those with records of human-rights violations and abuse of prisoners."); Self-Inflicted Wounds, Edito-
rial, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 17, 2005, at 8 ('[E]xtraordinary rendition[ ]' [is) the bureaucratic
euphemism for sending prisoners to countries where the public and the press don't kick up a fuss about
torture.").
36. See RODLEY, supra note 27, at 244 ("[Blecause of the official refusal to acknowledge the detention
I ] and . . . official abandonment of responsibility for the fate of the prisoner ... all legal and moral con-
straint on official behaviour is at once removed.").
37. See Dana Priest, CIA's Assurances on Transferred Suspects Doubted, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2005, at Al
(quoting an unnamed U.S. official as saying, "They say they are not abusing them, and that satisfies the
legal requirement, but we all know they do").
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1970s, 38 governments responded by denying that those individuals had ever
been taken into custody.39 Governments used disappearances to shield their
own officials from being implicated in extrajudicial executions and other
forms of ill-treatment of prisoners. 40 Extraordinary rendition constitutes an
attempt to avoid international condemnation of the use of torture and other
forms of ill-treatment as interrogation techniques; 4' officials contend that ex-
traordinary rendition is simply a benign alternative to extradition. 42
Reports suggest that Russia,43 Sweden, 44 and the United States have or-
chestrated extraordinary renditions.45 Other states reportedly have facilitated
extraordinary renditions either by providing intelligence or by conducting
the initial seizure. These states include Bosnia,46 Canada 4 7 Croatia,48 Geor-
gia,49 Indonesia,50 Iraq,51 Macedonia, 52 Malawi, 53 Pakistan, 54 and the United
38. See, e.g., JONATHAN POWER, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL: THE HUMAN RIGHTS STORY 21-22
(1981).
39. See MINN. LAW. INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS COMM., EXPECTATIONS DENIED: HABEAS CORPUS AND
THE SEARCH FOR GUATEMALA'S DISAPPEARED 4 (1988) ("Unexplained disappearances also prevent the
creation of public martyrs or political prisoners who might serve as a rallying point for the opposition.").
40. See AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 30, at 89 ("Impunity for the perpetrators is a common feature of
governmental programs of 'disappearances' and political killings. Secrecy helps to ensure impunity by
preventing the facts becoming known."); MINN. LAW. INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS COMM., supra note 39, at 4
("[A]s the term disappearance implies, the question of responsibility for kidnapping and/or murder is
evaded.").
41. See John Barry et al., The Roots of Torture, NEWSWEEK, May 24, 2004, at 26, 32 ("[Former CIA Di-
rector George] Tenet suggested [to Congress] it might be better sometimes for such suspects to remain in
the hands of foreign authorities, who might be able to use more aggressive interrogation methods.");
DeNeen L. Brown & Dana Priest, Deported Terror Suspect Details Torture in Syria, WASH. POST, Nov. 5,
2003, at Al (quoting a senior U.S. intelligence official: "The temptation is to have these folks in other
hands because they have different standards").
42. See Priest & Gellman, supra note 15 ("American teams, officials said, do no more than assist in the
transfer of suspects who are wanted on criminal charges by friendly countries."). But see John Crewdson et
al., Italy Charges CIA Agents, CHI. TRIB., June 25, 2005, at 1 ("'There are arrests, and then there are
arrests,' a senior American intelligence official said with a laugh .. "); Priest & Gellman, supra note 15
("[Flive officials acknowledged, as one of them put it, 'that sometimes a friendly country can be invited
to "want" someone we grab.' Then, other officials said, the foreign government will charge him with a
crime of some sort.").
43. See Peter Finn, Tajik Defendant Details Abduction by Russian Police, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 2005, at
A18.
44. See Craig Whitlock, New Swedish Documents Illuminate CIA Action, WASH. POST, May 21, 2005, at
Al.
45. The U.S. government admits to the practice. See R. Jeffrey Smith, Gonzales Defends Transfer of De-
tainees, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2005, at A3.
46. See Dana Priest & Joe Stephens, Secret World of U.S. Interrogation, WASH. POST, May 11, 2004, at
Al.
47. See Dana Priest, Man Was Deported After Syrian Assurances, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2003, at A24.
48. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
49. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IN THE NAME OF COUNTER-TERRORISM: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
WORLDWIDE 14 (2003), http://www.hrw.org/un/chr59/counter-terrorism-bck.pdf.
50. See Chandrasekaran & Finn, supra note 13.
51. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
52. See Crewdson et al., supra note 42.
53. See Stephen Grey, America's Gulag, NEW STATESMAN, May 17, 2004.
54. See Wilkinson & Drogin, supra note 12.
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Kingdom. 55 Still other states, including Afghanistan, 56 Egypt, 5 Jordan,58
Morocco, 59 Saudi Arabia, 60 Syria,61 and Uzbekistan, 62 have assisted by taking
custody of suspects after they are transferred out of the state where they are ab-
ducted. In many cases, the receiving states reportedly engage in torture and
other forms of ill-treatment of detainees on a systematic basis. 63 The use of
extraordinary rendition has accelerated since September 11, 2001,64 and wide-
spread reports of the United States' use of the practice may now serve as
justification for other countries seeking to adopt the tactic. 65
Drawing on the experiences of the human rights community in address-
ing disappearances, it is now necessary to examine the practice of extraordi-
nary rendition through the lens of existing human rights instruments. This
Article demonstrates that extraordinary rendition violates numerous interna-
tional human rights standards, including the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights,66 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,67 the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 68 the Con-
vention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 69 the Convention
against Torture,7 0 the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,7' and the
Geneva Conventions.7 2 The following Parts examine each instrument in turn,
55. See Stephen Grey & Andrew Buncombe, How Britain Helps the CIA Run Secret Torture Flights, IN-
DEP. (London), Feb. 10, 2005, at 8.
56. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
57. See Chandrasekaran & Finn, supra note 13.
58. See Priest & Gellman, supra note 15.
59. See Don Van Natta, Jr., Questioning Terror Suspects in a Dark and Surreal World, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 9,
2003, at 1.
60. See Priest & Gellman, supra note 15.
61. See Peter Finn, Al Qaeda Recruiter Reportedly Tortured, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2003, at A14.
62. See Stephen Grey, U.S. Accused of "Torture Flights," SUNDAY TIMES (London), Nov. 14, 2004, at 24.
63. See generally U.S. DEP'T STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2004
(2005), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004 (noting that receiving countries' use of torture is "sys-
tematic" [Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Uzbekistan], or "a common occurrence" [Syria]).
64. See Whitlock, supra note 10.
65. See, e.g., Finn, supra note 43 (quoting a Russian human rights worker as saying, "The West cannot
complain [about Russia's reported use of extraordinary rendition], and if they do, our leadership can say,
'Look at you, you do the same thing"').
66. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., lst plen.
mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) thereinafter Universal Declaration].
67. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, S. EXEC.
Doc. E, 95-2, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
68. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976,
993 U.N.T.S. 3.
69. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, entered into force Apr. 22, 1954, 19 U.ST. 6223,
189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, entered
into force Oct. 4, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter Refugee Protocol].
70. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention
against Torture].
71. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36, 21 U.S.T. 77, 100-1, 596
U.N.T.S. 261, 292 [hereinafter Vienna Consular Convention].
72. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter First Geneva
Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-
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and the conclusion addresses issues of implementing these human rights protec-
tions to stop the practice of extraordinary rendition.
I. EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION VIOLATES THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("Universal Declaration") is
the authoritative interpretation of the human rights obligations contained in
the United Nations Charter.73 Many of its provisions have attained the status of
international customary law. 74 In particular, the U.N. Economic and Social
Council's Human Rights Commission has affirmed that "the right to life,
freedom from torture, freedom of thought, conscience and religion and the
right to a fair trial" have achieved this status and "cannot be open to chal-
lenge by any State as they are indispensable for the functioning of an inter-
national community based on the rule of law and respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms. ' '75 Moreover, many domestic courts have made
reference to the Universal Declaration to describe international human rights
obligations, 76 and the Universal Declaration has also inspired constitutional
and legislative provisions in many nations. 77
Article 3 of the Universal Declaration guarantees the "right to life, liberty
and security of person." 78 The stories of Qassem, Rashul, and el Masri dem-
onstrate that the practice of extraordinary rendition implicates these rights;
abduction itself involves a deprivation of liberty and security. As developed
and articulated in subsequent human rights instruments, Article 5's prohibi-
tion on torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is
also relevant to extraordinary rendition, 79 particularly when coupled with
the Preamble's proclamation that all nations "shall strive ... to promote
respect" for the provisions of the Declaration and "to secure their universal and
effective recognition and observance ....- 80 For example, when the United
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.TS. 85 (here-
inafter Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
adopted Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter POW Convention]; Geneva Conven-
tion Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Civilian Convention].
73. See Hurst Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and Interna-
tional Law, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 287, 352-53 (1996) ("The most important multilateral treaty in
the field of human rights is perhaps the U.N. Charter .... Legally and politically, it is the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights which defines the Charter's human rights provisions.").
74. See id at 289.
75. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Human Rights, Preliminary Report by the
Special Representative of the Commission, Mr. Andris Aguilar, Appointed Pursuant to Resolution 1984/54, on the
Human Rights Situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 14-15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/20 (Feb. 1, 1985).
76. See Hannum, supra note 73, at 292-3 10.
77. See id. at 312-17.
78. Universal Declaration, supra note 66, art. 3.
79. See id. art. 5; infra notes 175-207 and accompanying text.
80. See Universal Declaration, supra note 66, at pmbl. Because extraordinary rendition involves the
forcible removal of individuals from the jurisdiction to which they belong, the practice also violates the
provision of Article 2 that provides that "no distinction shall be made on the basis of the ... jurisdic-
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States handed Qassem over to Egypt, a country where he had been sentenced
to death in absentia and a country the United States criticizes for its system-
atic use of torture,8 1 the United States was failing to uphold its obligation to
protect against torture and other forms of ill-treatment.
Because extraordinary rendition frequently denies individuals access to
recognized judicial procedures for extradition, 82 as well as to legal recogni-
tion in the receiving country,83 the procedure violates Article 6's guarantee
that "[elveryone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before
the law."'84 The subsequent incommunicado detention and denial of access to
counsel impede "the right to an effective remedy by the competent national
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the con-
stitution or by law ' 85 established in Article 8. Given that the countries re-
sponsible for extraordinary rendition sometimes arrest individuals on fabri-
cated charges or with no charges at all, 86 extraordinary rendition can consti-
tute "arbitrary arrest, detention or exile," 87 which is prohibited by Article 9.
Extraordinary rendition also violates Articles 10 and 11 which assure the
right to a fair and public hearing on criminal charges and the right to be pre-
sumed innocent until proven guilty according to law; 88 the lack of judicial
process indicates that countries orchestrating the procedure are operating
from a presumption of guilt 89 and that these countries afford individuals subject
to extraordinary rendition little or no opportunity to challenge that pre-
sumption.90 El Masri's case exposes these flaws in the system of extraordinary
tional ... status of the country or territory to which a person belongs." See id. art. 2.
81. See U.S. DEP'T STATE, supra note 63 ("The [Egyptian) security forces continued to mistreat and
torture prisoners .... [Tlorture and abuse of detainees by police, security personnel, and prison guards
remained common and persistent.").
82. See Chandrasekaran & Finn, supra note 13 (noting that extraordinary rendition "bypass[esl extradi-
tion procedures and legal formalities").
83. See, e.g., Shannon McCaffrey, supra note 16 (reporting that "most of the detainees are never heard
from again").
84. See Universal Declaration, supra note 66, art. 6.
85. See id. art. 8.
86. See Jehl & Johnston, supra note 17 (observing that criminal charges are not required for extraordi-
nary rendition); Priest & Gellman, supra note 15.
87. See Universal Declaration, supra note 66, art. 9.
88. See id. art. 10 ("Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent
and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge
against him."); id. art. 11(i) ("Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed inno-
cent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees neces-
sary for his defence."); cf. Boudellaa v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Decision on Admissibility and Merits,
Case No. CH/02/8679, Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Oct. 11, 2002, at 69
(holding that extraordinary rendition violated the right to be presumed innocent under Article 6(2) of
the European Convention on Human Rights).
89. See Helen Thomas, "Ghost Detainees" Should Haunt CIA, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 5,
2005, at B6 (quoting President Bush defending the program by stating that it is in "our country's inter-
est to find people who would do harm to us and get them out of harm's way").
90. For example, in at least two cases of extraordinary rendition, authorities did not notify the detain-
ees' attorneys of government transfer until after the rendition took place. See Complaint 60, at 18 Arar
v. Ashcroft, C.A. No. 04-CV-249-DGT-VVP (E.D.N.Y. 2004) [hereinafter Arar Complaint]; Craig
Whitlock, A Secret Deportation of Terror Suspects, WASH. POST, July 25, 2004, at Al.
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rendition; he was abducted, ill-treated, and interrogated for several months
because U.S. intelligence confused him with Khalid Masri, who was believed to
have an important role in the Hamburg cell of al Qaeda.91
Extraordinary rendition also implicates Article 13, which provides that all
persons have the right to leave any country and to return to their home coun-
try.92 More importantly, extraordinary rendition undermines the protection
of Article 14 that all persons have "the right to seek and to enjoy in other coun-
tries asylum from persecution, "93 because the procedure effectively delivers
people like Qassem to countries like Egypt where they are likely to suffer perse-
cution. 94 In some instances, people are also delivered from countries where
they had previously sought asylum.95 Extraordinary rendition implicates other
provisions of the Universal Declaration indirectly, including the right to
found a family;96 the prohibition against arbitrary deprivation of property; 97
freedom of thought, opinion, and expression; 98 and the right to "a social and
international order in which the rights and freedoms [of the] Declaration
can be fully realized." 99
II. EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION VIOLATES THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
While the Universal Declaration established a "common standard of achieve-
ment,"' 00 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR")
codified many of its provisions. 10 1 First, it is necessary to examine the terri-
91. See Zagaris, supra note 10; CBS News, supra note 10.
92. See Universal Declaration, supra note 66, art. 13.
93. See id. art. 14.
94. Reports demonstrate that many receiving countries are more likely to inflict torture and other
forms of ill-treatment on people suspected of participation in terrorism, extremism, or other political
activities. See U.S. DEP'T STATE, supra note 63 (reporting that Egyptian, Jordanian, Moroccan, Saudi,
Syrian, and Uzbek authorities have targeted political detainees and terror suspects for torture).
95. See, e.g., John Crewdson, Italy Seeks Arrests of Six More CIA Operatives, CHI. TRIB., July 21, 2005, at
3 (reporting that Abu Omar had been granted asylum in Italy prior to his abduction and reported ex-
traordinary rendition by CIA agents); Whitlock, supra note 90 (noting that Egyptian nationals Ahmed
Agiza and Muhammad Zery had applied for political asylum in Sweden prior to their extraordinary ren-
dition).
96. See Universal Declaration, supra note 66, art. 16.
97. See id. art. 17; cf. Haya de la Torre (Colom. v. Peru), 1951 ICJ Rep. 71,83 (June 13) (holding that
the International Court of Justice lacked authority to instruct Colombia in complying with the court's
determination that its grant of asylum was not valid and that Colombia was not obligated to hand Haya
de la Torre over to Peruvian authorities).
98. See Universal Declaration, supra note 66, arts. 18-19.
99. See id. art. 28.
100. See id. at pmbl.
101. See ICCPR, supra note 67. There are 154 States Parties to the ICCPR. Of the countries men-
tioned above for their involvement in extraordinary rendition, only Indonesia, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia
are not signatories to the ICCPR. See OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 2-11 (2004),
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf. Much of the following analysis applies with equal force to similar
provisions of the European Convention of Human Rights. See Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, as amended by Pro-
tocols Nos. 3, 5, 8, and 11 which entered into force on September 21, 1970, December 20, 1971, January 1,
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torial scope of the ICCPR. While the language of Article 2(1) suggests that
a State Party is only obligated to respect and ensure the rights of the ICCPR
"to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction,"10 2 the
Human Rights Committee has determined that a person need not be located
within a State Party's territory in order for that State Party to have obligations
toward that person; the person must merely be "within the power or effective
control" of the State Party.10 3 Therefore, once a State Party takes a person into
custody through extraordinary rendition, that detaining State Party is required
to afford the detainee the rights and protections enumerated in the ICCPR. 10 4
This provision is particularly important because the U.S. officials who conduct
extraordinary rendition never bring the detainees into U.S. territory.
Taking into consideration this territorial scope, several provisions of the
ICCPR bind states engaging in the practice of extraordinary rendition. Arti-
cle 7 prohibits torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment. 10 5 The Human Rights Committee has interpreted
this prohibition to require evidence of "a real risk of abusive treatment" in
cases of transfer.10 6 Article 10 requires States Parties to treat all detained persons
1990, and November 1, 1998 respectively [hereinafter European Convention). Because many extraordinary
renditions have taken place in European countries (either as the site of the abduction, a transit point, or a
final detention destination), the European Convention applies to certain cases of extraordinary rendition.
Moreover, the Council of Europe has taken an active position in investigating allegations of extraordinary
rendition among member states. See Eur. Parl. Ass., Alleged Secret Detentions in Council of Europe Member
States, Information Memorandum II, Comm. On Legal Aff. & Hum. Rts., Doc. No. AS/Jur(2006)03rev, paras.
12-24, 93-99, available at http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/ 2006/20060124_,Jdoc032006_E.pdf
(describing Rapporteur Dick Marty's investigation).
102. See ICCPR, supra note 67, art. 2(1) (emphasis added).
103. See United Nations, Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31, Nature of the General
Legal Obligation on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004), 10
[hereinafter General Comment 31]:
States Parties are required by article 2, paragraph 1, to respect and to ensure the Covenant
rights to all persons who may be within their territory and to all persons subject to their juris-
diction. This means that a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the
Covenant to anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not situ-
ated within the territory of the State Party .... This principle [that enjoyment of the Cove-
nant is not limited by nationality] also applies to those within the power or effective control of
the forces of a State Party acting outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which
such power or effective control was obtained ....
104. The Special Rapporreur on torture stated the obligation under Article 2(l) in broad terms: "[I]t
is the essential responsibility of States ... to prevent such acts [of torture and other forms of ill-
treatment] by not bringing persons under the control of other States if there are substantial grounds for
believing that they would be in danger of being subjected to torture." See Special Rapporteur on torture
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, 27, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N.
Doc. A/59/324 (Sept. 1, 2004) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur on Torture].
105. See ICCPR, supra note 67, art. 7; cf European Convention, supra note 101, art. 3.
106. See Ngoc Si Truong v. Canada, United Nations, Human Rights Committee, 77th Sess., Comm.
No. 743/1997, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/77/D743/1997, 7.5 (Mar. 28, 2003). The U.N. Sub-Commission
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights adopted a resolution in 2005 confirming that cus-
tomary international law prohibits the involuntary transfer of a person who "faces a real risk of being
subjected to torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or extrajudicial killing .... " Transfer of
Persons, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Commission on Human
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/L.12, 3 (Aug. 4, 2005) [hereinafter Transfer of Persons]. This
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"with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human per-
son." 10 Subjecting individuals to torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment after transfer violates the provisions of Articles 7 and
10, and the process of abduction and transfer itself may violate a detainee's
inherent human dignity.108 The Human Rights Committee has interpreted
Articles 2, 6,109 and 7 as follows:
[Tihe article 2 obligation requiring that States Parties respect and
ensure the Covenant rights for all persons in their territory and all
persons under their control entails an obligation not to extradite,
deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory,
where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a
real risk of irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles
6 and 7 of the Covenant, either in the country to which removal is
to be effected or in any country to which the person may subse-
quently be removed.110
In A.RJ. v. Australia,"l1 the Human Rights Committee entertained the pos-
sibility that "[t]o surrender a prisoner knowingly to another State where there
are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
tortured, while not explicitly covered by the wording of Article 7 of the
ICCPR, would run counter to its object and purpose."'1 12 The Committee has
determined that in some cases transfer may create a risk of treatment con-
trary to Article 7, and, therefore, countries conducting such transfers violate
Article 7.113 This risk is heightened when the State Party has already deter-
mined that the detainee has a well-founded fear of persecution upon re-
turn. 1 14 In Ahani v. Canada,115 the Committee "emphasize[d] that ... the
"real risk" standard is more stringent than the "substantial grounds" standard articulated in the non-
refoulement provision of the Convention against Torture. See David Weissbrodt & Isabel Hortreiter, The
Principle ofNon-Refoulement, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 1, 55-56 (1999) (comparing the two standards).
107. See ICCPR, supra note 67, art. 10(1).
108. Cf. Agiza v. Sweden, United Nations, Committee against Torture, 34th Sess., Comm. No.
233/2003, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/34/D/233/2003, T 13.3 (May 20, 2005) (determining that Agiza's treat-
ment during the extraordinary rendition process constituted cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment).
109. Article 6 provides that no person may be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life. See ICCPR, supra
note 67, art. 6(2); cf. European Convention, supra note 101, art. 2.
110. General Comment 31, supra note 103, 12.
111. United Nations, Human Rights Committee, 60th Sess., Comm. No. 692/1996, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/60/D/692/1996, 3.3 (July 28, 1997).
112. See id. 9 3.3 (noting complainant's argument as quoted above); id. 6.6-6.7, 6.14 (finding that
if the risk was determined to be "real," then complainant's transfer would implicate Article 7).
113. Byahuranga v. Denmark, United Nations, Human Rights Committee, 82nd Sess., Comm. No.
1222/203, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/1222/2003, 11.4 (Aug. 15, 2003). The 2005 Sub-Commission
resolution also based its conclusion "in particular" on Article 7 of the ICCPR and Article 3 of the Con-
vention against Torture. See Transfer of Persons, supra note 106, at pmbl.
114. See Mr. C. v. Australia, United Nations, Human Rights Committee, 76th Sess., Comm. No.
900/1999, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/76/D/900/1999, 8.5 (Oct. 28, 2002). The Human Rights Committee
was also concerned that Mr. C. would not have access to needed psychiatric medication if he were re-
turned to Iran. See id.
115. Ahani v. Canada, United Nations, Human Rights Committee, 80th Sess., Comm. No. 1051/2002,
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right to be free from torture requires . . . that the State party not only refrain
from torture but take steps of due diligence to avoid a threat to an individ-
ual of torture from third parties." 116 The guidance of the Human Rights
Committee indicates that the protections of Article 7 extend to cases of trans-
fer. 117 Article 7 is particularly relevant in evaluating Qassem's extraordinary
rendition to Egypt; the United States had substantial grounds to believe that
his transfer would place him in danger of being tortured.
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment ("Special Rapporteur on torture") recently reaffirmed that
"[tihe condoning of torture is per se a violation of the prohibition of tor-
ture." I  He also noted that "[t~here may be circumstances in which a failure
to ensure Covenant rights as required by article 2 would give rise to viola-
tions by States Parties of those rights .... 119 Extraordinary rendition "to
facilitate interrogation" 2 0 constitutes complicity with, and condoning of,
torture, and an abrogation of a State Party's duty to ensure rights under the
ICCPR. The Special Rapporteur on torture also expressed concern with whether
the use of diplomatic assurances "is not becoming a politically inspired sub-
stitute for the principle of non-refoulement.' 1 21
The CIA reportedly orchestrated Rashul's extraordinary rendition to Af-
ghanistan in order to facilitate intelligence-gathering. Given that the United
States already controlled substantial territory in Iraq at the time of his ex-
traordinary rendition, the United States seems to have been condoning tor-
ture by transferring Rashul beyond territory within its control.
Article 13 of the ICCPR prevents the expulsion of a non-citizen lawfully
present in the territory of a State Party unless the expulsion is "in pursuance
of a decision reached in accordance with law."'1 22 Prior to expulsion, the non-
citizen has the right to have a competent authority review the case, "except
where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require. "123 Height-
ened procedural safeguards are appropriate when there is a risk of torture.
The Human Rights Committee has determined that "where one of the high-
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/801D/1051/2002, 10.6 (Mar. 29, 2004).
116. Id. 10.7.
117. Cf Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 91 (1989) (holding that Article
3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which
provides that no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
is implicated when there is a real risk that a person will be subjected to such treatment or punishment
upon return). The Human Rights Committee has cited favorably to Soering in interpreting Article 7
obligations. See Kindler v. Canada, Comm. No. 470/1991, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991, 15.3
(July 30, 1993).
118. Special Rapporteur on torture, supra note 104, 15, at 5.
119. Id. 11, at 6.
120. See Jack Goldsmith, Draft Memorandum, Permissibility of Relocating Certain "Protected Per-
sons" from Occupied Iraq, Mar. 19, 2004, reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU
GHRAIB 367, 368 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2005); Priest &
Gellman, supra note 15.
121. See Special Rapporteur on torture, supra note 104, 31, at 9.
122. ICCPR, supra note 67, art. 13; cf. European Convention supra note 101, art. 5(1)(f).
123. See ICCPR, supra note 67, art. 13.
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est values protected by the Covenant, namely the right to be free from tor-
ture, is at stake, the closest scrutiny should be applied to the fairness of the
procedure applied to determine whether an individual is at a substantial risk
of torture."'1 24 Hence, extraordinary rendition violates Article 13 both be-
cause it is not grounded in a decision reached in accordance with the law,
and because it does not provide adequate review.1 25 While the United States
insists that the procedure is vital to national security,126 it is unclear why
national security would be undermined by review. Since the risk of torture is
present after extraordinary rendition, the lack of fair procedures to ascertain
whether expulsion is proper runs afoul of Article 13. In the case of Ahmed
Agiza, discussed infra, Sweden violated its obligation to provide heightened
procedural safeguards within the context of the Convention against Torture.
Article 9 states that every person "has the right to liberty and security of
person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one
shall be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with
such procedure as are established by law."'127 As with the protections in Arti-
cles 3, 9, 10, and 1 1 of the Universal Declaration, the lack of adequate judi-
cial procedural safeguards throughout the process of extraordinary rendition
indicates that the procedure constitutes a deprivation of liberty and security,
as well as an arbitrary arrest and detention, in violation of the ICCPR. Arti-
cle 9(4) entitles any person deprived of liberty by detention "to take pro-
ceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on
the lawfulness" of the detention. 2 8 Additionally, Article 16 states that 'Telvery-
one shall have the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the
law."'1 29 As demonstrated in the cases of Qassem, Rashul, and el Masri, trans-
ferring countries rarely, if ever, provide persons subjected to extraordinary
rendition with such judicial recognition or access either prior, or subsequent,
to the transfer. 130 Indeed, one of the purposes of extraordinary rendition ap-
pears to be to hold persons outside of the recognized judicial procedures for
extradition and criminal trial. 131
Extraordinary rendition implicitly violates Article 14 because detainees
are not "equal before the courts and tribunals,"' 32 and, in the first instance,
they are not allowed to come before courts and tribunals. Much like the pro-
visions of Articles 10 and 11 of the Universal Declaration, Article 14 of the
ICCPR calls for the presumption of innocence and for fair hearing. 33 As
124. Ahani v. Canada, supra note 115, 10.6.
125. See supra notes 82-83; infra note 196 and accompanying text.
126. See Zagaris, supra note 10 ("On March 16, 2005, President Bush defended extraordinary rendi-
tions as vital to the nation's defense.").
127. ICCPR, supra note 67, art. 9; cf European Convention supra note 101, art. 5.
128. ICCPR, supra note 67, art. 9.
129. See id. art. 16.
130. Seesupra notes 82-83.
131. See Chandrasekaran & Finn, supra note 13.
132. See ICCPR, supra note 67, art. 14(1); cf. European Convention, supra note 101, art. 6.
133. See ICCPR, supra note 67, art. 14(1) (fair hearing); id. art. 14(2) (presumption of innocence).
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discussed above, a presumption of guilt drives extraordinary rendition, and
detainees are not able to challenge that presumption in any "competent,
independent and impartial tribunal," as Article 14 requires. 134 Of the pro-
cedural safeguards articulated in Article 14(3), the most relevant and fun-
damental is the right to be informed promptly of the charge against the in-
dividual. 135 It is unclear whether authorities actually charge individuals sub-
ject to extraordinary rendition with crimes, and, if so, whether authorities
provide them with the other procedural guarantees established in Article 14.
At the very least, those guarantees are not present prior to their transfer, 36
and detainees are frequently denied access to counsel. 137 Moreover, the inter-
rogations that take place after transfer likely violate Article 14 (g)'s mini-
mum guarantee that persons "[n]ot ... be compelled to testify against [them-
selves] or to confess guilt."1 38 El Masri's case shows the consequences when a
country ignores its obligations under Article 14.
Extraordinary rendition more indirectly implicates other provisions of the
ICCPR, including the right to freedom of association, 139 the right to hold
opinions without interference, 140 and the right to freedom of movement. 141
Article 2 requires that persons claiming a violation of their rights under
the ICCPR must "have an effective remedy."' 142 Yet, as demonstrated in the
cases of Qassem, Rashul, and el Masri, detainees rarely have any effective means
to claim their rights under the ICCPR or to challenge their transfer.143
Most of the above protections in the ICCPR may be the subject of deroga-
tion. Derogation, however, is only allowed "to the extent strictly required by
the exigencies of the situation." 144 If a State Party elects to derogate, it must
immediately inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the specific
provisions from which it has derogated and the reasons for derogation.145
134. See id. art. 14(1).
135. See id. art. 14(3) ("[E]veryone shall be entitled ... [to be informed promptly ... of the nature
and cause of the charge against him ... .
136. See supra notes 82-83.
137. See supra note 90.
138. ICCPR, supra note 67, art. 14 (g); see also, e.g., Detainees: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm.,
109th Cong. (2005) (reporting that Mamdouh Habib "signed everything" and "confessed to all manner
of allegations" while detained and tortured in Egypt) (testimony of Joseph Margulies, attorney for Mam-
douh Habib); McCaffrey, supra note 16 (noting that Maher Arar falsely confessed to having terror ties
while detained and tortured in Syria). Similar to the terms of the preamble of the Universal Declaration,
the ICCPR requires each State Party to take steps "to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized" and "to give effect to the rights recognized
in the present Covenant." See ICCPR, supra note 67, art. 2. Hence, the territorial restriction does not
necessarily apply to the obligations to "respect" or "to give effect" to the rights recognized in the ICCPR.
139. See ICCPR, supra note 67, art. 22.
140. See id. art. 19.
141. See id. art. 12.
142. See id. art. 2(3)(a); cf. European Convention, supra note 101, art. 13.
143. See supra notes 82-83.
144. See ICCPR, supra note 67, art. 4(1); cf European Convention, supra note 101, art. 15(1).
145. See ICCPR, supra note 67, art. 4(3); cf European Convention, supra note 101, art. 15(3). Even in
the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has not formally announced that it is
derogating from the provisions of the ICCPR. See Kenneth Roth, The Law of War in the War on Terror,
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One non-derogable provision is the guarantee in Article 7 that "[nlo one
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment." 146 In light of the non-derogability of this provision, as well as
the requirement in Article 2 that each State Party give effect to the rights in
the ICCPR, it is clear that extraordinary rendition violates Article 7. An-
other non-derogable provision is Article 16, which guarantees the "right to
recognition everywhere as a person before the law." 147 This provision indi-
cates that under no circumstances may a country transfer persons in a way
that strips them of recognition before the law. States Parties also may not
derogate from the rights to freedom of thought, conscience, and belief, as
articulated in Article 18.148 Extraordinary rendition of a person based on
advocacy of unpopular beliefs may, therefore, violate Article 18.
III. EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION VIOLATES THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS
The U.N. adopted the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights in 1966 as a companion to the ICCPR. 149 Unlike the rights
articulated in the ICCPR, the provisions of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are not always immediately enforce-
able; States Parties are to implement the rights "to the maximum of [their]
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realiza-
tion of the rights ...."150 Additionally, the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights does not contain any explicit jurisdic-
tional limitations (unlike the ICCPR). 151 When a government abducts and
transports a person to another country to face torture and other forms of cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment, that government violates the person's eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights. Extraordinary rendition violates the Arti-
cle 11 right to an adequate standard of living for all persons and their fami-
lies. 152 Some of the transfer methods and interrogation tactics may also vio-
late the right to be free from hunger 153 and the right to physical and mental
FOREIGN AFF., Jan. 1, 2004, at 2, 6. The United Kingdom and several other countries have filed the
requisite derogation documents with the U.N. Secretary-General. Id.
146. See ICCPR, supra note 67, art. 4(2); cf European Convention, supra note 101, art. 15(2).
147. See ICCPR, supra note 67, art. 4(2).
148. See id. art. 18.
149. See WEISSBRODT ET AL., supra note 20, at 9. There are 151 States Parties to the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Of the countries mentioned above for their involve-
ment in extraordinary rendition, only Indonesia and Saudi Arabia have neither signed nor ratified the
Covenant. In addition, Pakistan and the United States have signed but not ratified the instrument. See
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Ratifications and Reservations: Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/
ratification/3.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2006).
150. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 68, art. 2(1).
151. See supra notes 102-104 and accompanying text.
152. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 68, art. 11(1).
153. See id. art. 11(2).
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health. 154 El Masri's story demonstrates that extraordinary rendition may
also undermine the family rights articulated in Article 10, because the proc-
ess separates a person from his or her family.155 As noted above, after el
Masri's extraordinary rendition, his family left Germany for Lebanon because
they believed el Masri had abandoned them.
IV. EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION VIOLATES THE CONVENTION AND
PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES
The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees ("Refugee Conven-
tion"), adopted by the United Nations in 1951,156 is relevant to an analysis
of extraordinary rendition since officials rarely abduct individuals in their
country of origin.15 7 While the Refugee Convention applies directly only to
persons who have become refugees as a result of events occurring before January
1, 1951,158 it has been applied to subsequent events by the Protocol Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees ("Refugee Protocol"). 159 A refugee is defined as
a person outside his or her country of nationality who has a "well-founded
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group or political opinion" and "is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself to the protection of that country .... "160
Therefore, the Refugee Convention and Protocol only protect such persons,
and only with regard to their potential transfer to their country of national-
ity or habitual residence. Rashul and el Masri were not transferred to their
countries of nationality, and therefore the Refugee Convention and Protocol
would not govern their extraordinary renditions. These instruments are rele-
vant, however, to the extraordinary rendition of Qassem and Agiza, discussed
supra and infra, respectively.
154. Seeid art. 12(1).
155. Seeid. art. 10.
156. See Refugee Convention, supra note 69.
157. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 1 (describing numerous cases of extraordinary rendition, none of which
involved seizure in the suspect's home country).
158. See Refugee Convention, supra note 69, art. 1(A)(2).
159. The Refugee Protocol effectively extended all the protections of the Refugee Convention to those
who had become refugees as a result of events occurring after January 1, 1951. Therefore, all of the provi-
sions of the Refugee Convention are made applicable to conduct relating to all refugees, regardless of when the
events responsible for their refugee status occurred. See Refugee Protocol, supra note 69, art. 1. The Refu-
gee Protocol also reiterates that Article 16(1) and Article 33 may not be subject to reservations. Id. art.
7(1). Of the countries mentioned above for their involvement in extraordinary rendition, Indonesia, Iraq,
Jordan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Uzbekistan are not parties to either the Refugee Convention or
the Refugee Protocol. The United States is not a party to the Refugee Convention, but is a party to the
Refugee Protocol. Afghanistan became a State Party to the Refugee Protocol as of August 30, 2005. Both
the Refugee Convention and the Refugee Protocol have 143 States Parties. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R
FOR REFUGEES, STATES PARTIES TO THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND
THE 1967 PROTOCOL, http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/protect/opendoc.pdf?.tbl= PROTECTION&
id=3b73b0d63 (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
160. Refugee Convention, supra note 69, art. l(A)(2); Refugee Protocol, supra note 69, art. 1(2).
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Article 12 of the Refugee Convention states that "[t]he personal status of
a refugee shall be governed by the law of the country of his domicile .... 161
Because extraordinary rendition typically circumvents the extradition laws
of the detainee's country of domicile, 162 it violates Article 12. Article 16
affords refugees free access to the courts of law on the territory of all States
Parties and provides that refugees shall enjoy "the same treatment as a na-
tional in matters pertaining to access to the courts." 163 To the extent that
Qassem and Agiza were subjected to deportation or extradition outside of the
legal extradition process presumably afforded to nationals of Croatia and
Sweden, their transfers violated Article 16. The provision of Article 16 guaran-
teeing "free access to the courts" may not be subject to any reservations.16
Extraordinary rendition also potentially violates the Refugee Convention's
Article 32 prohibition on the expulsion of a refugee without due process, 165
and the Article 33 prohibition on the return ("refouler") of a refugee to a place
where his or her life or freedom would be threatened. 166 Viewed in light of the
definition of refugee, the prohibition on return is limited to the transfer of a
person to his or her country of nationality or habitual residence. 67 As dem-
onstrated above, extraordinary rendition denies detainees due process of law
prior to expulsion. Although due process of law must always be afforded, under
Article 32 a refugee may be denied the right to submit evidence, to appeal,
or to have representation before a competent authority, if such denial of rights is
required by "compelling reasons of national security."'' 68 Yet, if a refugee
poses a threat to national security, the country of the refugee's domicile could
simply detain the individual. Therefore, the country of domicile would likely
have difficulty presenting "compelling reasons" to curtail the refugee's pro-
cedural rights under Article 32 while pursuing expulsion. Detention is ar-
guably a safer alternative than releasing the individual into the custody of
another state. Moreover, Article 32(3) gives refugees subject to expulsion a
"reasonable period within which to seek legal admission into another coun-
try."1 69 There is no evidence that countries ever honor this provision in the
process of extraordinary rendition.
The prohibition on refoulement in Article 33 is of particular concern be-
cause the countries receiving detainees frequently target political prisoners
161. See Refugee Convention, supra note 69, art. 12(1).
162. See Chandrasekaran & Finn, supra note 13 (noting that extraordinary rendition "bypass[es] extra-
dition procedures and legal formalities" and involves "few or no legal proceedings").
163. Refugee Convention, supra note 69, art. 16(1)-(2).
164. Id. arts. 16(1), 42.
165. See id. art. 32(2) ("The expulsion of such a refugee [who is lawfully present in a country] shall be
only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with due process of law.").
166. See id. art. 33(1) ("No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political. opinion.").
167. See Weissbrodt & Hortreiter, supra note 106, at 54.
168. Refugee Convention, supra note 69, art. 32(2).
169. Id. art. 32(3).
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and persons accused of extremism or terrorism for particularly harsh condi-
tions of confinement.1 70 Extraordinary rendition appears to violate Article
33's prohibition on return when the return will result in threats to an indi-
vidual's life or freedom on account of political opinion. Such was the case when
the United States sent Qassem back to Egypt, where he had been sentenced
to death in absentia. Even though Article 33(2) states that the prohibition
on refoulement does not extend to cases in which a refugee is a danger to the
security of the country in which the refugee is located, or where the refugee
has been convicted of a particularly serious crime,' 7' those conditions are
unlikely to be relevant when a person is at liberty in his or her country of
residence and is subsequently abducted by agents of another state. For ex-
ample, there is no evidence that the Croatian government found Qassem to
be a threat to state security. Article 33 is one of the Refugee Convention
provisions to which States Parties may not make reservations, 172 and it is,
therefore, non-derogable. Additionally, Article 1(3) of the Refugee Protocol
provides that "[tlhe present Protocol shall be applied by the States Parties
hereto without any geographic limitation . 1..."173 This provision, thus, bars
any effort to circumvent the provisions of the Refugee Convention and Pro-
tocol by altering the geographic location of a detainee.
Lastly, extraordinary rendition implicates other provisions of the Refugee
Convention, including the Article 26 protection of the freedom of movement,
and Article 31's allowance that the movement of refugees unlawfully resid-
ing in a country may only be restricted until such time that their status is
regularized.174
V. EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION VIOLATES THE CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE
The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment ("Convention against Torture") defines torture as
"any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person . "175 The Convention against Torture
170. See supra note 94.
171. See Refugee Convention, supra note 69, art. 33(2).
172. Id art. 42(1).
173. See Refugee Protocol, supra note 69, art. 1(3). But see Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155,
186 (1993) (holding that the protections of the Refugee Protocol do not extend to people encountered on
the high seas). The Supreme Court's decision in Sale has been roundly criticized for undermining the
intent and purpose of the Refugee Convention and Protocol. See, e.g., Harold Honju Koh, Reflections on
Refoulement and Haitian Ctrs. Council, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 15-17 (1994). While the Refugee Con-
vention and Protocol have no means by which individuals may bring complaints to an international body,
see Weissbrodt & Hortreiter, supra note 106, at 27, the Inter-American Commission found that the U.S.
practice of returning refugees found on the high seas violated Article 33. See Haitian Ctr. for Human
Rights v. United States, Case 10.675, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 51/95, OEA/ser.L/V./II.95 doc. 7
rev. at 550 (1997).
174. See Refugee Convention, supra note 69, arts. 26, 31.
175. Convention against Torture, supra note 70, art. 1(1). The Convention against Torture has 74 sig-
natories and 140 States Parties. Of the countries mentioned supra text accompanying notes 43-62 for
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requires only a minimal degree of state action to implicate its provisions; the
pain or suffering must be "inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the con-
sent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity."1 76 Article 16 requires every State Party to "undertake to prevent
in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture .... 1,77
If the receiving country tortures the detainee or subjects the detainee to
other forms of ill-treatment, that country is violating the Convention against
Torture. Article 3 is particularly important with regard to other countries par-
ticipating in extraordinary rendition since it prohibits refoulement to a state
where there are substantial grounds to believe that a person would be in
danger of being tortured.1 78 To determine whether such substantial grounds
exist, the article imposes procedural obligations by requiring that "the com-
petent authorities ... take into account all relevant considerations." 17 9 Arti-
cle 2 explicitly provides that States Parties may not advance any grounds to
justify torture.is ° Article 4 requires each State Party to ensure that all acts of
torture, as well as attempts to commit, or be compliant in, torture are criminal-
ized. 181 The Convention against Torture also requires each State Party to extra-
dite or prosecute accused torturers who are present in any territory under its
jurisdiction. 182
The history of the drafting of the Convention against Torture18 3 and the
jurisprudence of the Committee against Torture 184 provide valuable guid-
ance in interpreting the Convention against Torture's provisions, as applied
to the practice of extraordinary rendition. First, the drafting committees dis-
cussed the implications of Article 3 on existing extradition treaties. 185 The
drafters concluded that a State Party could make a valid reservation to Arti-
cle 3 on the grounds that it may be incompatible with its existing extradi-
tion treaties.1 86 However, to the extent that extraordinary rendition circum-
their involvement in extraordinary rendition, only Iraq and Pakistan are not signatories to the Conven-
tion against Torture. Syria became a State Party to the Convention against Torture on August 19, 2004.
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ratifications and Reservations:
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/9.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
176. Convention against Torture, supra note 70, art. 1(I).
177. Id. art. 16.
178. Id. art. 3(1).
179. Id. art. 3(2).
180. Id. art. 2(2) ("No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war,
internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.").
181. Id. art. 4(1).
182. Id. arts. 5, 7.
183. See generally BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 24, ch. 3 (tracing the actions and deliberations of
the United Nations General Assembly and United Nations Commission on Human Rights between
1977 and 1984 that led up to the entry into force of the Convention against Torture).
184. The Committee against Torture was established under the provision of Article 17 of the Conven-
tion against Torture. Convention against Torture, supra note 70, art. 17.
185. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 24, at 126-28.
186. Id. at 126-27.
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vents traditional methods of extradition, 187 a country engaging in extraordi-
nary rendition could not rely on such reservations to avoid implicating Arti-
cle 3. Indeed, there is no indication that the CIA followed standard extradi-
tion procedures in transferring Qassem to Egypt or Rashul and el Masri to Af-
ghanistan. Of the three men, only Qassem was wanted on criminal charges
in the receiving country.
Second, the history of the Convention against Torture clarifies that the draft-
ers intended Article 3 to have extraterritorial effect. The drafters modeled
Article 3 after Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, but they intended to
make the provisions of Article 3 broader in scope.188 During the drafting
process, they added the term "return ('refouler')" to Article 3 "in order to make
the provision more complete .... As it now reads, the article is intended to
cover all measures by which a person is physically transferred to another
state."'189 Therefore, while the CIA removed Rashul from his home country
to Afghanistan, the drafting history of the Convention against Torture dem-
onstrates that his transfer nonetheless constitutes refoulement and is prohib-
ited by Article 3.
The Committee against Torture has published two findings that are par-
ticularly relevant to the practice of extraordinary rendition. In Khan v. Can-
ada,190 the Committee determined that by transferring a person to a country
that was not a party to the Convention against Torture, Canada violated Ar-
ticle 3, both because the transfer would subject the person to a danger of tor-
ture, and because the transfer would make it impossible for the person to
apply for protection under the Convention against Torture.19' In Agiza v. Swe-
den, 192 the Committee against Torture determined that Sweden's use of ex-
traordinary rendition in December 2001 violated Article 3.193 With U.S.
assistance, the government of Sweden seized Egyptian asylee Ahmed Agiza
and transported him to Egypt. 194 The Committee found that "it was known,
or should have been known, to [Sweden]'s authorities at the time of [Agizal's
187. See Talk of the Nation: Policy of Extraordinary Rendition (National Public Radio broadcast Apr. 7,
2005) (Michael Scheuer).
188. BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 24, at 125:
In the Refugee Convention, protection is given to refugees, i.e. to persons who are persecuted
in their country of origin for a special reason, whereas article 3 of the present Convention ap-
plies to any person who, for whatever reason, is in danger of being subjected to torture if
handed over to another country.
189. Id. at 126.
190. Comm. No. 15/1994, Report of the Committee against Torture, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp.
No. 44, at 45, U.N. Doc. A/50/44, Annex V (1994).
191. See id. 12.5, at 55. It is important to note that simply because a receiving country is a party to
the Convention against Torture does not ensure that transfer to that country comports with the protec-
tions of Article 3. See Alan v. Switzerland, Comm. No. 21/1995, Report of the Committee against Tor-
ture, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 44, 11.5, at 75, U.N. Doc. A/51/44, Annex V (1995).
192. Comm. No. 233/2003, Report of the Committee against Torture, U.N. GAOR, 60th Sess.,
Supp. No. 44, 13.4, at 227, U.N. Doc. A/60/44, Annex VIII (2003).
193. Id. 14, at 37.
194. See id; see also Whitlock, supra note 44 (reporting that CIA transportation assistance was a
"friendly favor" to Swedish authorities).
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removal that Egypt resorted to consistent and widespread use of torture against
detainees, and that the risk of such treatment was particularly high in the
case of detainees held for political and security reasons."1 95 The Committee
also determined that "an inability to contest an expulsion decision before an
independent authority . . . [is] relevant to a finding of a violation of article
3" because it violates "the procedural obligation to provide for effective, in-
dependent and impartial review required by article 3 of the Convention. '196
The Committee rejected Sweden's argument that it had obtained assurances
from the government of Egypt to ensure that Agiza would not be ill-treated. 197
A recent report by the Special Rapporteur on torture confirms that extraor-
dinary rendition violates Article 3 of the Convention against Torture. 198
Extraordinary rendition may also constitute a conspiracy to commit tor-
ture in violation of the Convention against Torture. Countries not directly
committing acts of torture, but facilitating the practice by providing intel-
ligence or material assistance, may violate Article l's prohibition on state
"consent or acquiescence"'1 99 to torture. They may also violate domestic laws,
enacted in compliance with Article 4 of the Convention against Torture,
which criminalize torture. For example, U.S. officials with direct involve-
ment in extraordinary rendition have revealed that they were aware that the
transfers were likely to result in torture, 200 and many have suggested that
the administration was "turning a blind eye" 20 1 to that likelihood. In some
cases, officials from the country conducting the extraordinary rendition di-
rectly participate in the interrogation process after the detainee is delivered
to the receiving country.202 El Masri, for instance, reported that his interro-
195. Report of the Committee against Torture, supra note 192, 13.4, at 34.
196. Id 1 13.7-13.8, at 36.
197. See id. 13.4, at 227 ("The procurement of diplomatic assurances, which, moreover, provided no
mechanism for their enforcement, did not suffice to protect against this manifest risk."); see also Transfer
of Persons, supra note 106, 4-6 (discouraging the use of assurances, and establishing detailed recom-
mendations for states to enforce assurances). One former CIA official described these assurances as a "legal
nicety." See Michael Scheuer, A Fine Rendition, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2005, at A23.
198. See Special Rapporteur on torture, supra note 104, 29, at 9:
The Special Rapporteur is seriously concerned about an increase in practices that undermine
th[e] principle [ofnon-refoulement]. One such practice is for the police authorities of one country
to hand over persons to their counterparts in other countries without the intervention of a ju-
dicial authority and without any possibility for the persons concerned to contact their families
or their lawyers. The Committee against Torture . .. found that practice to be in violation of
article 3 of the Convention, as well as of the right to due process.
199. Convention against Torture, supra note 70, art. 1(1).
200. See Grey & Buncombe, supra note 55 ("Mr. Scheuer claims there was legal oversight in every ren-
ditioning case and yet he admitted suspects were tortured."); Priest & Gellman, supra note 15 ("One
official who has had direct involvement in renditions said he knew they were likely to be tortured. 'I ...
do it with my eyes open,' he said.").
201. SeeJehl & Johnston, supra note 17 ("[In interviews, a half-dozen current and former government
officials said they believed that, in practice, the administration's approach may have involved turning a
blind eye to torture.").
202. See Finn, supra note 61 (reporting that U.S. officials participated in the questioning of one terror
suspect while he was detained in Morocco); Priest & Gellman, supra note 15 (noting similar collaboration
with authorities in Jordan and Saudi Arabia).
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gators in Afghanistan were U.S. officials using an interpreter.20 3 At the very
least, these reports suggest "consent or acquiescence" to torture in violation
of Article 1. Qassem's extraordinary rendition to Egypt also suggests a height-
ened level of U.S. involvement: in the 1990s, CIA officers reportedly col-
laborated with Egyptian interrogators to such an extent that the U.S. officials
would provide their Egyptian counterparts with a list of questions in the morn-
ing, and they would receive the answers by evening. 20 4 This close coopera-
tion demonstrates that the United States was encouraging and relying upon
the Egyptians' interrogation techniques.
Additionally, Article 1 is implicated when countries such as Sweden attempt
to obtain diplomatic assurances that receiving countries will not subject
transferred detainees to torture, particularly when the receiving countries
systematically practice torture20 5 and also demonstrate a pattern of denying
the existence of torture. 20 6 The Special Rapporteur on torture has expressly
stated that when a receiving state engages in a systematic practice of torture,
"the principle of non-refoulement must be strictly observed and diplomatic
assurances should not be resorted to." 20 7 These comments directly implicate
Sweden's transfer of Agiza to Egypt.
VI. EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION VIOLATES THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON
CONSULAR RELATIONS
The Vienna Convention. on Consular Relations ("Vienna Consular Conven-
tion") provides special protections for diplomats, 20 8 and also guarantees con-
sular access to individuals not located in their country of nationality.20 9 Un-
der the terms of Article 36, States Parties must allow consular officers to
communicate with nationals of their home country.210 If a State Party takes a
203. See CBS News, supra note 10.
204. Mayer, supra note 1, at 110.
205. See McCaffrey, supra note 16 ("You would have to be deaf, dumb and blind to believe that the
Syrians were not going to use torture, even if they are making claims to the contrary.") (quoting former
CIA counterterrorism official Vincent Cannistraro); see also Transfer of Persons, supra note 106, 4
(confirming that there is a presumption of a real risk of ill-treatment where that treatment is widespread
or systematic); U.S. DEP'T STATE, supra note 63 (describing U.S. State Department reports of systematic
use of torture in many receiving countries).
206. See U.S. DEP'T STATE, supra note 63 (reporting that officials in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi
Arabia, and Uzbekistan have denied allegations that torture is practiced in their countries); Mayer, supra
note 1, at 118 (noting that one Egyptian official described an Australian detainee's allegations of torture
as "mythology").
207. Special Rapporteur on torture, supra note 104, 37, at 21.
208. Vienna Consular Convention, supra note 71, arts. 31-35, 40-43.
209. Id. art. 36. There are 140 States Parties to the Vienna Consular Convention. With the exception
of Afghanistan, all of the countries mentioned above for their involvement in extraordinary rendition are
States Parties to the Vienna Consular Convention. See U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular
Affairs, Consular Notification and Access Part 5: Legal Material, http://travel.scate.gov/law/consular/
consular_744.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
210. Vienna Consular Convention, supra note 71, art. 36(1)(a) ("[Clonsular officers shall be free to
communicate with nationals of the sending State and to have access to them. Nationals of the sending
State shall have the same freedom with respect to communication with and access to consular officers of
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person into custody, it must inform the detainee of the right to consular ac-
cess.2" The Vienna Consular Convention requires the detaining authority to
notify the detainee's consular post of the detention if the detainee requests
such notification. 21
2
It is likely that extraordinary rendition breaches these provisions of the
Vienna Consular Convention only with respect to the country in which the
person is seized and the country in which the person is ultimately detained
(if that country is not the detainee's home country).213 Some commentators
have argued that the Vienna Consular Convention's protections may also govern
the conduct of a country asserting authority during invasion and occupa-
tion;2 14 this conclusion suggests that the Vienna Consular Convention could
also apply to the country responsible for orchestrating the transfer, even if
that country, technically, is not the one in which the person is seized or de-
tained.
There are at least two documented cases of extraordinary rendition in which
government officials, in violation of Article 36, denied individuals access to
consular officers. In September 2002, the United States detained Maher
Arar, who holds dual Canadian and Syrian citizenship. 215 For one week, de-
taining authorities denied Arar access to Canadian consular officials, and after
his transfer to Syria, the United States refused to acknowledge the transfer to
Canadian authorities.2 16 In November 2002, officials detained British citizen
the sending State ....").
211. Id. art. 36(1)(b) ("The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his
rights under this sub-paragraph."). The duty to inform "without delay" has been interpreted by the
International Court of Justice to be imposed "once it is realized that the person is a foreign national, or
once there are grounds to think that the person is probably a foreign national." See Case Concerning
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States), 2004 I.C.J. No. 128 63, at 33 (Mar.
31, 2004). The International Court of Justice has held that a delay of forty hours after realization that a
person is a foreign national constitutes a violation of Article 36(1)(b). See id. 89, at 39. Moreover, the
rights in Article 36 are interrelated, and when a detainee is not informed of his or her rights under Arti-
cle 36(1)(b), the other provisions of Article 36 may also be implicated. See id. 99, at 41. By failing to
inform a detainee of the right to consular access, a detaining authority may also deny the detainee's coun-
try of nationality the right to access the detainee. See id. In cases of extraordinary rendition, the detaining
authorities undoubtedly have good reason to believe that the detainee is a foreign national, and certainly
the delay in notification is at least forty hours, if not indefinite. Therefore, the rights of both the detainee
and the detainee's country of citizenship are implicated by the practice of extraordinary rendition.
212. Vienna Consular Convention, supra note 71, art. 36(1)(b) ("[I1f he so requests, the competent au-
thorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if,
within its consular district, a national of that State is ... detained in any ... manner.").
213. The language of Article 36(1)(b) applies to the "receiving State" of the consular official, but the
obligations of Article 36(1)(b) only apply when the detainee is present "within [the] consular district [of
the sending State]." See id.
214. See Theodor Meron, Prisoners of War, Civilians and Diplomats in the GulfCrisis, 85 AM. J. INT'L L.
104, 108-09 (1991) (arguing that the Vienna Consular Convention could have allowed Iraq to expel
diplomats in occupied Kuwait); John Embry Parkerson, Jr., United States Compliance with Humanitarian
Law Respecting Civilians During Operation Just Cause, 133 MIL. L. REV. 31, 115 (1991) (demonstrating that
the Vienna Consular Convention applies during times of war, and, therefore, occupying and invading
powers must comply with the Convention's provisions).
215. See Michael Hirsh et al., supra note 10, at 32.
216. See Arar Complaint, supra note 90, 39-40, at 13 (noting that the Canadian consulate was
only informed of Arar's detention one week after it had begun, and even then only due to a communica-
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Wahab al Rawi in The Gambia.2 17 While being interrogated at the head-
quarters of the country's secret police, al Rawi requested and was denied consu-
lar access. 21
8
Due to the secrecy surrounding the practice of extraordinary rendition,
there is no direct documentation of other instances of violations of the Vi-
enna Consular Convention. However, since persons subjected to extraordinary
rendition evidently have not have made use of consular assistance, it is likely
that, in many instances, officials are denying detainees their right to consu-
lar communication. El Masri's captors, for instance, told him, "You're in a
country without laws and no one knows where you are. Do you know what
that means?" 219 Such a statement suggests that officials are using extraordi-
nary rendition to deny individuals their rights under the Vienna Consular Con-
vention.
VII. EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION VIOLATES THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 primarily articulate protections for per-
sons involved in armed conflict. 220 Within those protections are several pro-
visions relevant to the practice of extraordinary rendition. They include the
prohibition on torture and inhuman treatment of prisoners of war, the pro-
hibition on forcible transfer of civilians during occupation, and the prohibi-
tions on torture and cruel or humiliating treatment under Common Article
3. The following sections examine each of these provisions in turn.
A. Protections Afforded to Prisoners of War
The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
("POW Convention") protects prisoners of war ("POWs") detained as a con-
sequence of international armed conflict.2 21 Several categories of persons are
protected as POWs. "Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict"
are granted POW protection when they fall into enemy hands.222 Article 4
also affords protected person status to "members of militias or volunteer corps
forming part of [the] armed forces" and "members of other militias ... in-
cluding those of organized resistance movements. '"223 Persons falling under
tion from Arar's family); id. 60, at 18 (indicating that the United States refused to acknowledge Arar's
transfer after Canadian consular officials made inquiries).
217. Grey, supra note 62.
218. Grey, supra note 53. Grey reports that al Rawi made his request to a U.S. official who was inter-
rogating him. However, al Rawi was detained in a Gambian facility and therefore Gambian officials
would still be bound by the Vienna Consular Convention, even if the U.S. official technically might not.
219. See CBS News, supra note 10.
220. All of the countries mentioned above as participants in extraordinary rendition, including
Afghanistan and Iraq, where the most recent armed conflicts have occurred, are High Contracting Parties
to all four Geneva Conventions. See U.S. DEP'T STATE, TREATIES iN FORCE 3 (2004), http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/38569.pdf.
221. See POW Convention, supra note 72, art. 2.
222. Id. art. 4(a)(1).
223. Id. art. 4(a)(1)-().
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the latter category, however, must comply with four additional requirements
in order to be eligible for protection. Those requirements include carrying
arms openly and "having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance."
224
Nearly every person who is not protected as a POW, however, automatically
acquires protected person status under the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War ("Civilian Convention"). 225 If
a person's status as a POW is in doubt, that person retains the protections of
the POW Convention until a competent tribunal, as defined by Article 5,
determines his or her status.
226
Grave breaches under the POW Convention include "willful killing, torture
or inhuman treatment, . . . [and] willfully causing great suffering or serious
injury to body or health. "227 Under the terms of Article 131, States may not
derogate from the provisions of the POW Convention. 228 Although the Ge-
neva Conventions leave "torture" undefined,229 Pictet's authoritative commen-
tary states that inhuman treatment may include "being brought down to the
level of animals" and "[clertain measures ... which might cut prisoners of
war off completely from the outside world and in particular from their fami-
lies. ... 230 Pictet observes that the prohibition on causing great suffering
includes "moral suffering" and he notes that a perpetrator may cause great
224. The four requirements are, "(a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subor-
dinates; (b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) That of carrying arms
openly; (d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war." Id. art.
4(a)(2). The authoritative commentary of Jean S. Pictet confirms that these requirements are only im-
posed on members of resistance movements, and not on members of the armed forces of a Party to the
conflict. See 4 INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY, IV GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO
THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN THE TIME OF WAR 50 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter
Pictet, CIVILIAN COMMENTARY).
225. See Pictet, CIVILIAN COMMENTARY, supra note 224, at 50 ("[I]f, for some reason, prisoner of war
status-to take one example-were denied to them, they would become protected persons under the [Fourth)
Convention."). Members of resistance movements who failed to fulfill the four criteria in Article 4(a)(2)
must be considered to be protected persons within the meaning of the [Fourth] Convention." Id; see also
Civilian Convention, supra note 72, art. 5 (allowing authorities to limit some of the communication rights of
protected civilians who are "spies or saboteurs"); Pictet, CIVILIAN COMMENTARY, supra note 224, at 53 (observ-
ing that the drafters of the Geneva Conventions decided to protect "irregular combatants" who "act[ ]
deliberately outside the laws of warfare" because "the terms espionage, sabotage, terrorism, banditry, and
intelligence with the enemy, have so often been used lightly, and applied to such trivial offences, that it was
not advisable to leave the accused at the mercy of those detaining them"). Recall, however, that persons
detained by their own country or a co-belligerent state are not protected. See POW Convention, supra
note 72.
226. See POW Convention, supra note 72, art. 5, 2.
227. Id. art. 130.
228. See id. art. 131.
229. In the absence of a definition of torture within the Convention itself, other international instru-
ments may be used to demonstrate customary understanding of the term. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija,
Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgment, 111 (July 21, 2000) (holding that the definition of torture in
Article 1 of the Convention against Torture "reflects customary international law").
230. III INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY, GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 627 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter Pictet, POW COMMEN-
TARY).
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suffering in order to effect punishment or revenge, or simply to satisfy the per-
petrator's sadistic desires.2 3'
High Contracting Parties may transfer POWs into the custody of other
nations, but only "to a Power which is a party to the Convention and after
the Detaining Power has satisfied itself of the willingness and ability of such
transferee Power to apply the Convention. '232 Common Article 1 of the Ge-
neva Conventions states that "[tlhe High Contracting Parties undertake to
respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances."233
Hence, the use of extraordinary rendition, which does not ensure respect for
the provisions prohibiting torture, inhuman treatment, and the infliction of
suffering by the receiving country, violates both Article 1 and the substan-
tive provisions prohibiting ill-treatment. Additionally, "[t]he safeguard con-
tained in [Article 121 is reinforced by Article 131 relating to the responsi-
bilities of the Contracting Parties, which may not absolve themselves of any
liability incurred in respect of one of the grave breaches defined in Article
130."234 The obligations of Article 12 persist after transfer; if the receiving
power "fails to carry out the provisions of the Convention in any important
respect," the transferring power must "take effective measures to correct the
situation. 235 A transferring power may commit a grave breach either if the
ill-treatment the transferee receives after transfer is "willful,"' 236 or if the trans-
ferring power receives notice of torture or inhuman treatment in the receiv-
ing country and fails to take subsequent corrective action. 237 Additionally,
regardless of any ill-treatment a detainee may suffer after transfer, extraordi-
nary rendition cuts detainees off from the outside world and hence constitutes
inhuman treatment, itself a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions. 238
B. Protections Afforded to Civilians
The Civilian Convention protects civilians during times of armed conflict
and occupation. 239 Article 4 of the Civilian Convention denies protected
person status to persons who are in the hands of their own government 240 and,
during armed conflict, to nationals of co-belligerent and neutral states. 24'
The Civilian Convention protects all other civilians held during armed conflict
from torture and other ill-treatment, just as the POW Convention protects
POWs from such abuses. 242 Thus, Rashul, an Iraqi national, is a protected
231. See id. at 628.
232. POW Convention, supra note 72, art. 12, 2.
233. See, e.g., id. art. 1 (emphasis added).
234. Picter, POW COMMENTARY, supra note 230, art. 12, 1.
235. POW Convention, supra note 72, art. 12, 3.
236. Id. art. 130 (defining grave breaches to include "wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment").
237. See id. art. 131.
238. See Pictet, POW COMMENTARY, supra note 230, at 627.
239. See Civilian Convention, supra note 72, art. 4.
240. See id. art. 4, para. 1.
241. See id.
242. Compare Civilian Convention, supra note 72, art. 147, with POW Convention, supra note 72, art.
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person under the Civilian Convention during the conflict in Iraq. This is be-
cause during occupation, 43 nationals of neutral states become protected per-
sons,2 44 and special provisions of the Civilian Convention, such as Article 49,
apply. Article 49 prohibits the transfer or deportation of protected persons
out of the occupied territory, regardless of the occupier's motive, except
when an occupying power evacuates an area for security or military reasons. 245
The Civilian Convention defines the same grave breaches as the POW
Convention, but also includes "unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful
confinement of a protected person."246 Therefore, the Civilian Convention in-
corporates the provisions of Article 49 into its grave breaches. Extraordinary
rendition violates Article 49 when it originates in an occupied territory and
involves a person protected as a civilian under the Civilian Convention. 247
Hence, the CIA's removal of Rashul from Iraq during the U.S. occupation of
Iraq violated Article 49.
The United States, which plays a major role in orchestrating extraordinary
renditions, has argued that forcible transfer of civilians out of occupied terri-
tory is not always a violation of Article 49. In particular, U.S. officials argue
that Article 49 does not prohibit forcible transfers that comport with exist-
ing immigration laws.248 Moreover, they argue that Article 49 allows for short-
term transfers out of the occupied territory to "facilitate interrogation. "2 49 Pre-
sumably, this argument was the justification for Rashul's transfer to Afghani-
stan. Nevertheless, such claims ignore the plain language of Article 49, the
130.
243. Iraq became an occupied territory after the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003. See Senior Military
Officials, U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Department Background Briefing (May 14, 2004),
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tr20040514-0752.html ("From the very beginning of the
conflict, the Geneva Conventions have been fully applicable .... We are now in a state of legal occupa-
tion. The Geneva Conventions are applicable ...."). Arguably, Afghanistan was occupied by U.S. forces
after the invasion in the fall of 2001. See Steve Sheppard, Propter Honoris Respectum: Passion and Nation:
War, Crime, and Guilt in the Individual and the Collective, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 751, 751 (2003) ("At
the time of this writing, U.S. soldiers guard the recently occupied capital of Afghanistan ...."). But see
Drew Brown, Official Says More Troops Could Have Kept Fewer Terrorists from Escaping, KNIGHT RID-
DER/TRIB. Bus. NEWS, June 27, 2002 ("The United States and its allies have been anxious to avoid being
perceived as foreign occupiers or invaders in Afghanistan. About 14,000 U.S. and allied troops are in the
country."). Allowing a High Contracting Party to make a unilateral determination that it is not an occu-
pying power would undermine the special protections afforded under the Civilian Convention during
times of occupation. The protections afforded during occupation extend as long as the occupying power is
exercising functions of government. See Civilian Convention, supra note 72, art. 6.
244. See Civilian Convention, supra note 72, art. 4 (stating that nationals of neutral states "who find
themselves in the territory of a belligerent State" are not protected). When occupation begins, those
nationals of neutral states are no longer in "the territory of a belligerent State." Therefore, they gain the
status of protected persons. See Pictet, CIVILIAN COMMENTARY, supra note 224, at 48.
245. Civilian Convention, supra note 72, art. 49.
246. Id. art. 147.
247. The CIA reportedly transferred as many as twelve detainees out of occupied Iraq in 2004. See
Priest, supra note 6 ("One intelligence official familiar with the operation said the CIA has ... secretly
transport[ed] as many as a dozen detainees out of Iraq in the last six months.").
248. See Goldsmith, supra note 120, at 372.
249. See id. at 376-79.
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historical impetus for the prohibition on involuntary transfer, and Pictet's au-
thoritative commentary.
First, Article 49 prohibits forcible transfers and deportations "regardless
of their motive."2 50 Article 49 only allows for forcible evacuations under the
limited circumstances articulated in the second paragraph, and the expressio
unius interpretive canon suggests that Article 49 permits no other forcible
transfers or deportations. Moreover, Article 49 was drafted in response to
Nazi Germany's policy of stripping Jews of their citizenship to render their
presence in occupied territories unlawful, thereby forcing their deporta-
tion.251 Hannah Arendt noted that the Nazis took "extreme care" to insist
that all Jews of non-German nationality "should be deprived of their citizen-
ship either prior to, or, at the latest, on the day of deportation. "252 Further-
more, Pictet's commentary states definitively that "[tihe prohibition
[against deportations and forcible transfers in Article 49(1)1 is absolute and
allows of [sic] no exceptions, apart from those stipulated in paragraph 2.1"253
Article 49 is intended to prohibit all forms of forcible transfer of persons
protected under the Civilian Convention, regardless of their legal status within
the occupied territory, and regardless of the length of time that the transfer
will last. Therefore, extraordinary rendition of protected civilians, such as
Rashul, from occupied territory violates Article 49 and is a grave breach of
the Civilian Convention.
C. Protections Provided Under Common Article 3
Common Article 3 articulates minimum protections for "the case of armed
conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of
the High Contracting Parties" to any of the Geneva Conventions. 254 It pro-
vides "rules of humanity which are recognized as essential by civilized na-
250. Civilian Convention, supra note 72, art. 49.
251. See Pictet, CIVILIAN COMMENTARY, supra note 224, at 278:
There is doubtless no need to give an account here of the painful recollections called forth by
the "deportations" of the Second World War, for they are still present in everyone's memory. It
will suffice to mention that millions of human beings were torn from their homes, separated
from their families and deported from their country ....
252. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 280 (2d enlarged ed. 1958).
253. Pictet, CIVILIAN COMMENTARY, supra note 224, at 279.
254. See First Geneva Convention, supra note 72, art. 3; Second Geneva Convention, supra note 72, art.
3; POW Convention, supra note 72, art. 3; Civilian Convention, supra note 72, art. 3. In all other armed
conflicts that might not be governed either by the entirety of the Geneva Conventions or Common Arti-
cle 3, the Additional Protocols of 1977 provide similar protections. See Protocol Additional to the Ge-
neva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol 1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conven-
tions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. Much of Protocol I and parts of Protocol II are
customary international humanitarian law. See Anthony Cullen, Key Developments Affecting the Scope of
Internal Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law, 183 MIL. L. REV. 66, 88 n.85 (2005); see also
Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the Under-
standing and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 175, 187-90 (2005).
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tions" and applies "without any condition in regard to reciprocity. '255 Arti-
cle 3 protects persons taking no active part in hostilities, including those who
have laid down their arms.256 While some officials argue that Common Arti-
cle 3 does not apply to international conflicts, 257 Pictet explains that the article
was rooted in "the idea of applying the principle to all cases of armed conflict,
including internal ones."258 It seems illogical that greater international safe-
guards might govern a purely internal armed conflict than would govern an
armed conflict that is international in character.259 Moreover, the Additional
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions are designed to extend Article 3 pro-
tections to all persons.
260
255. Pictet, POW COMMENTARY, supra note 230, at 34-35.
256. See, e.g., POW Convention, supra note 72, art. 3(1). Common Article 3 makes no distinction
based on nationality or other status. The only persons unprotected in an armed conflict governed by
Article 3 are those actively engaged in the hostilities. They become protected when they cease active
engagement for any reason.
257. See Memorandum from George W. Bush, President of the United States, to Dick Cheney, Vice
President of the United States, et al., Re: Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7,
2002), reprinted in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 120, at 134-35 ("[C]ommon Article 3 of Geneva
does not apply to either al Qaeda or Taliban detainees, because, among other reasons, the relevant
conflicts are international in scope and Common Article 3 applies only to 'armed conflict not of an inter-
national character.").
258. Piccet, CIVILIAN COMMENTARY, supra note 224, at 26.
259. See David Kretzmer, Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate
Means of Defence?, 16 FUR. J. INT'L L. 171, 195 (2005) ("There is no substantive reason why the norms
that apply to an armed conflict between a state and an organized armed group within its territory should
not also apply to an armed conflict with such a group that is not restricted to its territory."); see also
Hamdan v. Bush, 415 F.3d 33, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 622 (2005) ("It is universally
agreed, and is demonstrable in the Convention language itself, in the context in which it was adopted,
and by the generally accepted law of nations, that Common Article 3 embodies international human
norms, and that it sets forth the most fundamental requirements of the law of war." (citations and inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)). The Court of Appeals engages in a selective reading of Picter's Commen-
tary, quoting the last three words of the following paragraph:
Speaking generally, it must be recognized that the conflicts referred to in Article 3 are armed
conflicts, with armed forces on either side engaged in hostilities-conflicts, in short, which are in
many respects similar to an international war, but take place within the confines of a single
country.
Piccet, POW COMMENTARY, supra note 230, at 37. The Court does not make reference to the immedi-
ately preceding paragraph, which reads:
We think ... that the scope of application of the Article must be as wide as possible. There
can be no drawbacks to this, since the Article in its reduced form, contrary to what might be
thought, does not in any way limit the right of a State to put down rebellion, nor does it in-
crease in the slightest the authority of the rebel party. It merely demands respect for certain
rules, which were already recognized as essential in all civilized countries, and embodied in the
national legislation of the States in question, long before the Convention was signed. What
Government would dare to claim before the world, in a case of civil disturbances which could
justly be described as mere acts of banditry, that, Article 3 not being applicable, it was enti-
tled to leave the wounded uncared for, to torture and mutilate prisoners and take hostages? No
Government can object to observing, in its dealings with enemies, whatever the nature of the
conflict between it and them, a few essential rules which it in fact observes daily, under its own
laws, when dealing with common criminals.
Id. at 36-37.
260. See Protocol I, supra note 254; see also Protocol II, supra note 254. Of the countries involved in ex-
traordinary rendition, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Iraq, Morocco, Pakistan, and the United States are not
States Parties to Protocols I and II. Syria is not a State Party to Protocol II. See International Committee
of the Red Cross, States Parry to the Main Treaties, available at http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/(SPF)/party-
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Article 3 protects "[plersons taking no active part in the hostilities" from
"violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture."2 6 Article 3 also provides that those persons
"shall in all circumstances be treated humanely."2 62 Additionally, Article 3
"prohibit[s] at any time and in any place whatsoever ... cruel treatment or
torture"2 63 and "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating
and degrading treatment. '264 Pictet observes that "no excuse, no attenuating
circumstances" can justify these acts. 265 Pictet's comment suggests that authori-
ties may not use extraordinary rendition to excuse or avoid responsibility for
torture or for cruel, humiliating, or degrading treatment. Therefore, under
conditions of armed conflict not otherwise governed by the Geneva Conven-
tions, extraordinary rendition violates Common Article 3 if it constitutes an
effort to cause or justify torture or cruel, humiliating, or degrading treatment.
VIII. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTIONS
A thorough examination of extraordinary rendition in light of available hu-
man rights instruments is only the first step in addressing the gross human
rights violations involved with extraordinary rendition; implementing these
instruments presents a tremendous challenge. One traditional tool for pre-
venting or discouraging human rights violations is embarrassment. 266 By
revealing that governments are acting in flagrant violation of customary in-
ternational law and human rights instruments to which they are parties, the
international community can exert pressure on the offending governments to
halt their practices. Countries should not expect that the world community will
look away or excuse human rights violations simply because of the threat of
global terrorism. If the struggle against terror is being conducted as part of a
larger effort to win people's hearts and minds all over the world, governments
must uphold international human rights standards in order to maintain le-
gitimacy in that effort. Terrorists use abduction and kidnapping to instill
fear. Governments who pay lip service to the rule of law should not them-
selves resort to tactics employed by the very terrorists they battle. By using
such reprehensible tactics, countries risk alienating valuable allies and open-
main_treaties/$File/IHL and-other-relatedTreaties.pdf.
261. See, e.g., First Geneva Convention, supra note 72, art. 3(1); Second Geneva Convention, supra note
72, art. 3(1); POW Convention, supra note 72, art. 3(1); Civilian Convention, supra note 72, art. 3(1).
262. First Geneva Convention, supra note 72, art. 3(1); Second Geneva Convention, supra note 72, art.
3(1); POW Convention, supra note 72, art. 3(1); Civilian Convention, supra note 72, art. 3(1).
263. First Geneva Convention, supra note 72, art. 3(l)(a); Second Geneva Convention, supra note 72,
art. 3(1)(a); POW Convention, supra note 72, art. 3(l)(a); Civilian Convention, supra note 72, art. 3()(a).
264. First Geneva Convention, supra note 72, art. 3(1)(c); Second Geneva Convention, supra note 72,
art. 3(1)(c); POW Convention, supra note 72, art. 3()(c); Civilian Convention, supra note 72, art. 3(1)(c).
265. Picter, CIVILIAN COMMENTARY, supra note 224, at 38.
266. See Robert Kent,Julie A. Mertus' Bait and Switch: Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy, 18 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 300, 301 (2005) (book note) ("Civil society's traditional mechanism for promoting human
rights has been publicity campaigns to shame those who breach human rights obligations.").
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ing the door to further human rights abuses by other governments. Extraor-
dinary rendition can subvert the rule of law and, hence, undermine essential
international law enforcement cooperation.
National and international human rights concerns can operate in tandem
to expose violations and spark criticism of government involvement in ex-
traordinary rendition. 67 International attention can also lay the groundwork
for encouraging formal enforcement. 268 When abductions take place without
the consent or authorization of the local government, prosecutors may bring
criminal charges of kidnapping and assault.2 69 Civil suits may also exert
pressure on governments participating in extraordinary rendition.2 70
Universal criminal jurisdiction may provide yet another tool for challeng-
ing the practice. 271 In 2004, the New York-based Center for Constitutional
Rights relied on Germany's universal jurisdiction law to initiate a criminal
prosecution on behalf of several Abu Ghraib detainees against Donald Rumsfeld
and other high-ranking U.S. officials. 272 Although this proceeding was dis-
missed under the principle of subsidiarity,273 Germany is currently investi-
267. For example, the Canadian government has been conducting a public investigation of the Maher
Arar case for over a year. See Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to
Maher Arar, http://www.ararcommission.ca/eng/. After conducting an investigation of the extraordinary
renditions of two Egyptian-born asylum seekers, Swedish authorities have promised that they will never
participate in extraordinary renditions with U.S. or other foreign agents again. See Whitlock, supra note
44 (noting that Sweden has completed an investigation of the incident); see also Whitlock, supra note 10
(reporting that one Swedish official has stated that the country will no longer participate in extraordinary
renditions with the United States or other governments). But see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GETTING
AWAY WITH TORTURE?: COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE U.S. ABUSE OF DETAINEES 83 (2005),
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/usO405/usO405.pdf ("Given that the two people who can trigger inves-
tigations and prosecutions for the alleged war crimes and acts of torture ... have been deeply involved in
the policies leading to these alleged crimes, if not in the crimes themselves, it is extremely unlikely that
any such investigations will be undertaken."). A detailed analysis of the role of domestic courts in enforc-
ing international human rights law is beyond the scope of this Article. For further information see gener-
ally Ralph Steinhardt, The Role of Domestic Courts in Enforcing International Human Rights Law, in GUIDE
TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 267-89 (Hurst Hannum ed., 4th ed. 2004).
268. See Kathryn Sikkink, A Typology of Relationships Between Social Movements and International Institu-
tions, 97 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 301, 303 (2003) ("[O]nce a state's human rights misconduct has been
exposed, more damaging bilateral or multilateral enforcement may follow.").
269. See, e.g., Crewdson, supra note 95 (noting that Italy issued arrest warrants for several CIA opera-
tives alleged to have conducted an extraordinary rendition on Italian territory without the consent of
local authorities).
270. See, e.g., Boudellaa v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Case No. CH/02/8679, Human Rights Chamber
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 18 (Oct. 11, 2002) (awarding compensation and restoration of citizenship
to several individuals who were subjected to extraordinary rendition under the assistance of the Federal
Ministry of the Interior of Bosnia and Herzegovina).
271. See, e.g., V.30.6.2002 (Budesgesetzblart 1. 1 S. 2254) [German Code of Crimes Against Interna-
tional Law, hereinafter GCCAIL], English version available at Max Planck Institute for Foreign and Inter-
national Criminal Law, http://www.iuscrim.mpg.de/forsch/legaltext/VStGBengl.pdf (last visited Jan. 8,
2006).
272. See generally Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Torture in Abu Ghraib: The Complaint Against Donald Rums-
feld under the German Code of Crimes Against International Law, 6 GERMAN L.J. 689 (2005) (describing the
legal background for the suit).
273. See General Prosecuting Attorney of the Federal Court, Rough English Translation of German
Prosecutor's Dismissal, at 3 (Feb. 10, 2005), available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/september 1 lth/docs/
german-appeal-english-tran.pdf. The principle of subsidiarity holds that if the GCCAIL is not necessary
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gating the extraordinary rendition of el Masri, a German national.2 74 This
time, because a German national is the victim of the crime, and because the
United States has initiated no effort to punish the perpetrators, German au-
thorities may prove more willing to invoke universal jurisdiction and to prose-
cute the individuals responsible for el Masri's extraordinary rendition. 275
Several of the human rights instruments implicated by extraordinary ren-
dition, either explicitly or implicitly, require States Parties to take affirmative
steps to address the practice. For example, the Preamble of the Universal
Declaration directs countries to "strive ... to secure ... universal and effec-
tive recognition and observance '276 of the rights it articulates. Because the
Universal Declaration obligates nations to strive to secure the "right to rec-
ognition everywhere as a person before the law" 277 for all people, presumably
it also obligates countries to provide individuals with a legal mechanism to
challenge their extraordinary rendition. A similar logic applies to the non-
derogable right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law under
the ICCPR. 278 Should a country refuse to assert jurisdiction over a person who
has been subjected to extraordinary rendition, that country would be violat-
ing these provisions.
The Convention against Torture requires each State Party to "ensure that
its competent authorities proceed to a prompt and impartial investigation,
wherever there is reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture has been
committed in any territory under its jurisdiction. '279 While it is unlikely that
governments participating in extraordinary rendition will follow this provi-
sion, other safeguards in the Convention against Torture suggest that the obli-
gation to investigate allegations of torture extends more broadly. For in-
stance, the Convention against Torture requires States Parties to extradite or
prosecute persons suspected of engaging in torture. 280 The Convention against
Torture's drafters considered and rejected a proposal to permit a State Party
to wait for an extradition request. 281 They concluded that other States Par-
ties who can potentially prosecute alleged torturers would often decline to assert
jurisdiction. 282 Therefore, if a State Party finds a suspected torturer on its terri-
in order to fill gaps where the International Criminal Court does not have jurisdiction and where other
domestic courts fail to act, then the German investigative authorities will decline to pursue the com-
plaint.
274. See Whitlock, supra note 10.
275. Cf Daniel D. Ntanda Nsereko, Prosecutorial Discretion Before National Courts and International Tri-
bunals, 3 J. INT'L CaIM. JUST. 124, 127 (2005).
276. Universal Declaration, supra note 66, art. 6.
277. Id.
278. See ICCPR, supra note 147, art. 4(2).
279. See Convention against Torture, supra note 70, art. 12.
280. See id. arts. 5, 7.
281. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 24, at 137.
282. See Michael P. Scharf, Application of Treaty-Based Universal Jurisdiction to Nationals of Non-Party
States, 35 NEw ENG. L. REV. 363, 368-69 (2001) ("Crimes subject to the universality principle occur...
in situations in which the territorial State and State of the accused's nationality are unlikely to exercise
jurisdiction, because, for example, the perpetrators are State authorities or agents of the State.").
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tory, that State Party is obligated to take the alleged offender into custody or
to take other measures to ensure the presence of the alleged offender.283
Next, the State Party must make an immediate preliminary inquiry into the
facts. 284 Then, if the suspect's home country makes no effort to bring about
extradition, the State Party must prosecute the suspect.2 85
The Geneva Conventions contain a common article that establishes the
obligation of High Contracting Parties to enact penal sanctions criminaliz-
ing grave breaches. 286 In addition to this obligation, each High Contracting
Parry is required "to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have
ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons,
regardless of their nationality, before its own courts." 287 This affirmative duty
reflects the obligation in Article 1 "to respect and to ensure respect for the pre-
sent Convention in all circumstances.' 288 It is apparent that the Geneva Con-
ventions require High Contracting Parties to search for and punish persons
alleged to have committed grave breaches of its provisions. 289 As demon-
strated above, extraordinary rendition can constitute a grave breach both be-
cause it results in torture and other forms of ill-treatment, and because it is
an involuntary transfer in violation of Article 49. Countries seeking to avoid
the responsibility to prosecute officials responsible for grave breaches may
themselves be violating the Geneva Conventions.
The justification for this obligation to arrest and prosecute is similar to
that regarding violators of the Convention against Torture: "[O1ther reme-
dies, such as those provided by the political branches, are most often ineffec-
tive and inadequate. '290 This is so for several reasons. First, high-level officials
in the political branches are themselves often responsible for orchestrating
grave breaches. Second, the country serving as the location of the ill-treatment
is not likely to take action to challenge its own interrogation practices. Third,
the country of nationality of the person subjected to extraordinary rendition
may be unlikely to step forward in defending that person. Extraordinary rendi-
tion is commonly characterized as an effort to detain and question terror sus-
pects. Governments may therefore be reluctant to intervene on behalf of per-
283. See Convention against Torture, supra note 70, art. 6(1).
284. See id. art. 6(2).
285. See id. art. 7(1).
286. See First Geneva Convention, supra note 72, art. 49; Second Geneva Convention, supra note 72,
art. 50; POW Convention, supra note 72, art. 129; Civilian Convention, supra note 72, art. 147.
287. POW Convention, supra note 72, art. 129.
288. See, e.g., Civilian Convention, supra note 72, art. 1 (emphasis added).
289. See Chet J. Tan, Jr., The Proliferation of Bilateral Non-Surrender Agreements Among Non-Ratifiers of the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1115, 1170 (2004):
[The Geneva Conventions] also vest[ I this prerogative to prosecute in states that were not a
party to the war in question. The treaty makes no distinctions based on whether or not there is
a nexus between the accused, the alleged acts constituting grave breaches of the Geneva Con-
ventions, and the state that exercises jurisdiction over the case.
290. Francisco Forrest Martin, The International Human Rights and Ethical Aspects of the Forum Non Con-
veniens Doctrine, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 101, 117 (2003-04).
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sons reported to be supporters of terrorism.2 9 1 For example, because U.S.
officials suspected that Rashul was involved in the Iraqi insurgency, the in-
terim Iraqi government would have had little motivation to petition the
United States for his release. Further, there is a substantial risk that the de-
tainee's relatives and officials of the detainee's country of origin are unaware
of the detention and transfer, as evidenced by the departure of el Masri's
family for Lebanon. All of these factors combine to demonstrate that other
High Contracting Parties have a heightened obligation to intervene, prose-
cute, and punish persons responsible for grave breaches when the grave breaches
involve extraordinary rendition.
The International Criminal Court ("ICC") may also present a viable means
for bringing the perpetrators of extraordinary rendition to justice. 292 The
crime may be construed as occurring both in the country from which the
detainee originates and in the country where the detainee is ultimately held.
Either location, therefore, would provide ICC jurisdiction over those respon-
sible for extraordinary rendition based on the territory where the crime oc-
curs.293 The United States is likely to criticize harshly any attempt to exer-
cise ICC jurisdiction over U.S. nationals,294 but this mechanism may also be
a more palatable means of bringing people to justice since it avoids drawing
attention to one country's prosecutorial zeal. 295 While the United States has
negotiated bilateral agreements with many countries to prohibit surrender of
members of the U.S. military to the ICC, 296 European nations have rejected
291. CNN Live From: Saudi Arabia Speaks Out About Terrorism (CNN television broadcast May 16,
2003) ("We are on board 200 percent to find the criminals who did this [and] those who support them,
and justify them, and bring them to justice. We will work with the United States and every other coun-
try that can provide assistance in order to unravel this terrorist network.") (statement of Adel al-Jubeir,
Saudi Foreign Affairs Advisor).
292. See ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
32/A/CONE, 183/9.
293. See id. art. 12(2) ("[T]he Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the following States
are Parties to this Statute ... (a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred
.... "). The International Criminal Court [hereinafter ICC] also has jurisdiction over people who are
nationals of States Parties. Id. art.. 12 (2)(b).
294. In fact, it could lead to war. See American Servicemembers' Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 107-206,
Title II, § 2008, 116 Stat. 905 (2002) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 7427 (2005)) (granting "[aluthority to
free members of the Armed Forces of the United States and certain other persons detained or imprisoned
by or on behalf of the [ICC]"); see also Benjamin B. Ferencz, Letter to U.S. Senators Regarding the Ameri-
can Servicemembers Protection Act (ASPA) (June 24, 2002), http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icc/
2002/0624ben.htm ("[ASPA] contains the largest grant of war-powers by Congress to the Executive since
the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution.").
295. See Damien Vandermeersch, Prosecuting International Crimes in Belgium, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
400, 420 (2005) ("[Tlhe major problem currently remains countries who, despite having undertaken
international obligations, continue to drag their feet and default on their duty to initiate and carry out
prosecution, whether they are unwilling or unable to do so. The ICC was established precisely to counter
such pitfalls.").
296. One commentator referred to United States efforts to negotiate such bilateral non-surrender
agreements as "a massive, worldwide campaign." See Tan, supra note 289, at 1122. As of May 2005, the
United States had signed 100 such agreements with other countries. See Press Statement by Richard
Boucher, U.S. Department of State Spokesperson, U.S. Signs 100th Article 98 Agreement (May 3, 2005),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/45 5 73.htm.
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these attempts to evade criminal responsibility.297 As with the exercise of
universal jurisdiction in domestic courts, invoking the authority of interna-
tional criminal law could prompt the United States to extradite and prose-
cute its own nationals.2 98
Other international tribunals may also play an important role in ending ex-
traordinary rendition. The jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee
and the Committee against Torture suggests that those bodies would find that
extraordinary rendition violates their respective instruments. Moreover, the
International Court of Justice may serve as a useful forum for addressing some
violations of the Vienna Consular Convention.299
Because the U.S. government is a primary architect of extraordinary ren-
dition, examining domestic U.S. law for means of implementing relevant
international norms is useful. The federal habeas corpus statute300 provides a
mechanism by which persons subjected to extraordinary rendition can chal-
lenge their detention in a U.S. court.30 1 Because the statute affords habeas
relief to persons held in custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States," Qassem, Rashul, el Masri, or their relatives30 2
can challenge their detentions as violating any of the instruments described
above to which the U.S. is a party.30 3 Moreover, federal statutes criminalize
war crimes under the Geneva Conventions, 30 4 as well as extraterritorial tor-
ture and the conspiracy to commit torture.30 5 While it is presently unlikely
that U.S. prosecutors will initiate prosecutions against U.S. officials in U.S.
courts for those crimes, a person could petition for habeas relief on the
297. Counsel of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Threats to the International Criminal Court, Eur.
Parl. Res. 1336, at 2 (2003), available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/COE1336.pdf (stating that the
agreements violate the Rome Statute and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties); see also Salvatore
Zappali, The Reaction of the U.S. to the Entry into Force of the ICC Statute: Comments on U.N. S.C. Resolution
1422 (2002) and Article 98 Agreements, I J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 114, 126-28 (2003) (explaining the Euro-
pean Union's reaction to these agreements and the importance of preserving the integrity of the ICC).
298. Cf Tan, supra note 289, at 115.
299. See supra note 71.
300. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2000) (providing habeas relief for persons "in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States"). The 2005 amendment to the federal habeas statute
eliminates habeas jurisdiction only for persons "detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba." See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148, Tit. X,
§ 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. 2680, 2742 (2005) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)). Therefore, the protec-
tions of the habeas statute are still available to persons detained either by the CIA or outside of Guan-
tanamo Bay.
301. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483-84 (2004). Butcf Khalid v. Bush, 355 E Supp. 2d 311,
321 (D.D.C. 2005); Qassim v. Bush, No. Civ. A. 05-0497(JR), 2005 WL 3508654, at *3-*5 (D.D.C.
Dec. 22, 2005) (mem.) (holding that even though the indefinite detention of two Muslim Uighur detain-
ees at the Guantanamo detention center is unlawful, the court "has no relief to offer" under the habeas
statute because the government has failed to find a country to accept them).
302. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163-64 (1990) (explaining the standard for "next
friend" habeas standing).
303. For example, all three could have valid claims under the Convention against Torture, while
Rashul alone would be able to invoke the protection of the Geneva Conventions.
304. War Crimes Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-192, 110 Stat. 2104 (1996) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2441 (2000)).
305. 18 U.S.C. § 2340-2340A (West 2000 & Supp. 2005).
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grounds that the detention violates those statutes. Criminal prosecution may
be more likely in the future.
Tort actions may also provide a remedy. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain30 6 the
Supreme Court concluded that illegal detention for less than one day did not
violate a norm of customary international law sufficient to invoke jurisdic-
tion under the Alien Tort Statute. 30 7 The torture and long-term detention in-
volved in extraordinary rendition, however, still remain valid claims after the
Sosa decision. 30 8
The thematic procedures established by the Commission on Human Rights
constitute one other prompt mechanism for responding to human rights viola-
tions occurring in the context of extraordinary rendition. For example, the
Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights while
countering terrorism, 30 9 the Special Rapporteur on torture,310 the Working
Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, 31' and the Working Group
on Arbitrary Detention 312 can assist persons wishing to challenge extraordi-
nary rendition by "function[ing] as a means of communication between gov-
ernments and victims of human rights abuses." 313 Special Rapporteurs and
Working Groups are authorized to make urgent appeals to governments, to
conduct fact-finding, and to work to end specific human rights abuses.314 More-
over, the mandate of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disap-
pearances is "to assist families in determining the fate and whereabouts of
their relatives who, having disappeared, are placed outside the protection of
the law,"31 5 and to investigate such cases. 316
Additionally, on September 23, 2005, negotiations were completed on the
new International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from En-
forced Disappearance ("Enforced Disappearance Convention"). 317 While the
306. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
307. See id. at 738.
308. See id. at 732 (citing with approval Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980)),
that "the torturer has become-like the pirate and slave trader before him-hostis humani generis, an
enemy of all mankind").
309. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on
the promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism, Introduction, http://ww
w.ohchr.org/english/issues/terrorism/rapporteur/srchr.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2006).
310. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Special Rapporteur on
torture, http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/torture/rapporteur/index.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2006).
311. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Working Group on En-
forced or Involuntary Disappearances, Introduction, http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/disappear/index.
htm [hereinafter Working Group on Enforced Disappearancesl (last visited Oct. 25, 2005).
312. See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention, Introduction, http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/derention/index.htm (last visited
Oct. 25, 2005).
313. WEISSBRODT ET AL., supra note 20, at 247.
314. Seeid.
315. Working Group on Enforced Disappearances, supra note 311.
316. See id.
317. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, UN
Doc. E/CN.4/2005/WG.22/WP. I/REV.4 (Sept. 23, 2005), available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/
disappear/docs/E.CN.4.2005 .WG.22.WP. I .REV.4.pdf.
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draft convention has not yet opened for signature, it "represents significant
progress in international law for the protection of persons from enforced dis-
appearance. "318 In particular, it establishes an explicit definition of enforced
disappearance consistent with the elements of extraordinary rendition. 319 The
Enforced Disappearance Convention could be a useful tool to protect against
and stop the practice of extraordinary rendition. It is also helpful in its cur-
rent form because it provides further evidence that state-sponsored secret abduc-
tions violate fundamental human rights. The Enforced Disappearance Con-
vention is likely to draw attention to the issue of extraordinary rendition as
it opens for signature in 2006.
The countries directly involved in extraordinary rendition may themselves
provide the most effective means of addressing the practice. Countries that
have orchestrated extraordinary renditions have sacrificed the moral author-
ity to be leaders in promoting the rule of law and respect for human rights.320
Countries with poor human rights records that have been enlisted to receive
suspects may react with hostility when their partners in torture persist in criti-
cizing their human rights practices. 321 In order to regain international le-
gitimacy, the architects of extraordinary rendition may need to take dra-
matic steps to show the world that they intend to play by the rules. 322 Only
then will they have a genuine opportunity to compel other countries to comply
with the important obligations embodied in contemporary human rights
instruments.
318. Statement, Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, United Nations Com-
mission on Human Rights, Working Group on Disappearances Welcomes Conclusion of Drafting of
Convention on Enforced Disappearances (Sept. 23, 2005), http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/O/
C4C046A3919202FEC12570A0002F01B6?opendocument.
319. International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, supra
note 317, art. 2 (defining enforced disappearance as "the arrest, detention, abduction, or any other form
of deprivation of liberty committed by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with
the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the depriva-
tion of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a
person outside the protection of the law").
320. See, e.g., Tom Malinowski, Wash. Advocacy Dir., Hudson Inst., America's Mission: Debating
Strategies for the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights, State Department Briefing, FED. NEWS
SERVICE (June 20, 2005) (reporting that when the Prime Minister of Egypt was confronted with allega-
tions of torture, he responded, "Well, you know, we do what we have to, just like the United States").
321. See, e.g., Alec Russell, Quit Terror War Base, Uzbekistan Dictator Orders US Special Fores, DAILY TELE-
GRAPH (London), Aug. 1, 2005, at 10 (confirming that Uzbekistan ordered the United States to abandon
a military base on its territory as "tensions with Washington over the country's human rights record ...
abruptly cfa]me to a head").
322. See Noah Feldman, Ugly Americans, NEW REPUBLIC, May 30, 2005, at 23 ("I)f the United States
aimed to demand accountability with international norms, it had better begin by actively and visibly
upholding those norms itself.").
